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I dedicate this thesis with my heartfelt gratitude and love to my long-suffering 
and very supportive family - Sarah, Thomas, Tushari and William Richards. I 
also dedicate it to Baha'u'llah, Prophet Founder of the Baha'i Faith, whose 
universal spiritual teachings of the 19th century have provided me with a 
global vision of social and environmental issues, and which include a clear 
understanding of the need for global governance in areas of paramount 
importance to the welfare of humanity since "the world is but one country and 
mankind its citizens."




This PhD by Publication traces through 13 of my publications on economic 
incentives for forest management and conservation in tropical countries (with 
a regional bias towards Latin America), including several papers focused on 
participatory forest management or community-based conservation. The 
papers show how my thinking has evolved from a focus on market and non- 
market incentives, to an increasing emphasis on governance and regulatory 
incentives in explaining stakeholder behaviour to the forest resource, as well 
as the equity impacts. They reveal that positive incentives and win-win 
(environmental and poverty reduction) outcomes will only emerge when the 
underlying market, policy and institutional failures are tackled. Because of 
their public good values, the survival of tropical forests is contingent on the 
actions of the international community and governments.
Sustainable forestry, therefore, depends on a combination of domestic 
governance progress to control illegal logging and the rent-seeking powers of 
vested interest groups, global governance regulations which create markets 
for environmental services, secure property rights for resident stakeholders 
and extra-sectoral policies that moderate land use opportunity costs. The 
current main hope for tropical forests is 'avoided deforestation 1 , since this will 
need to tackle the forest governance problems and underlying multi-sectoral 
drivers of deforestation if it is to be successful. It represents a balanced 
market (payments for ecosystem services) and supply-side (improved 
governance) response to what is essentially a 'public goods' management 
problem, but will need to overcome some major political economy challenges.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and definitions
The theme of this PhD by Publication is an exploration of economic incentives 
for the sustainable management and conservation of tropical forests. This 
investigation has spanned 17 years (1990-2006) of my career in development, 
which commenced in 1977. Prior to 1990, I worked for 13 years as an 
agricultural or rural development economist on long-term assignments for the 
UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations in Malawi, Sri Lanka, 
Mexico and Honduras.
It is important at the outset to define the term 'incentive' since this is often 
used to mean a subsidy. Here it is used in a broader sense to refer to the 
economic motivation of forest managers and other stakeholders to manage or 
conserve (or not) the forest resource, in response to a set of market, policy 
and/or institutional signals or messages received. These signals either come 
directly from the market place in the form of a price change, or more indirectly 
as the result of a legal, policy or institutional change, and motivate forest 
users or managers to become more or less interested in 'sustainable forest 
management' (SFM) or conservation.
A second clarification is my use of the word 'economic'. I use 'economic' in a 
broad sense to refer to the values of a range of forest goods and services, 
including environmental and social benefits and costs, on the basis that they 
have an economic value to society, even though this may not be quantifiable. 
The terms SFM and participatory forest management (PFM) are also used 
continuously in this narrative. There are at least fifty definitions of SFM in the 
literature, an indication of how controversial it is. An authoritative one is forest 
management that seeks to ensure that "forest-related activities should not 
damage the forest to the extent that its capacity to deliver products and 
services - such as timber, water and biodiversity conservation - is 
significantly reduced. Forest management should also aim to balance the
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needs of different forest users so that its benefits and costs are shared 
equitably" (International Tropical Timber Organization, 2005) 1 . Two aspects of 
this definition are striking: firstly the message that 'perfect' sustainability is 
unrealistic and it is more a question of minimising ecosystem damage. It is 
therefore tempting to use terms like 'well-managed forest' or 'good forest 
management', but SFM is so widely used that it is easier to stick to 
convention. The second aspect of this SFM definition is the importance given 
to social sustainability. It should also be pointed out that SFM is not the same 
as 'appropriate' forest management, since deforestation can sometimes be 
appropriate.
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) can be defined as any attempt at 
forest management involving local people, whether in the form of 
communities, small groups or individual villagers co-operating in a larger 
programme. In PFM the social and livelihood benefits of forest management 
are given more emphasis than in an 'industrial forestry' setting. The terms 
SFM and PFM are used here to refer mainly to the management of naturally 
occurring forests, rather than to forestry based on planted trees, such as 
plantation forestry, trees on farms and agroforestry.
The scope of this thesis is limited in terms of forest type and geographically. 
The author's main experience has been of natural forest management and 
conservation in the tropical and sub-tropical forests of Latin America and 
Ghana, and to a lesser extent, drier sub-tropical montane forests of Nepal and 
Northern India. Therefore, the thesis and its policy prescriptions do not extend 
to, for example, the arid and semi-arid forest systems of Africa and Asia or the 
wetter tropical forest systems found particularly in Southeast Asia, including 
the important adaptive forest management experiences involving these and 
other forest systems (Buck et al, 2001). Similarly, the thesis has less to say
1 Another useful and simpler definition is 'the management of forests in a way which 
optimises the social, economic and environmental benefits of forests for both present 
and future generations' (Dresner et at., 2006).
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about agroforestry, farm forestry or small or large-scale plantation forestry2 . It 
is also geographically constrained in its scope given that much of the analysis 
is from Latin America, with only three papers (3, 9 and 10) involving primary 
data collection and analysis from other regions. The policy discussion and 
conclusions in Section 3 are therefore less relevant to Asia and Africa.
1.2 How important are tropical forests?
The importance of this research narrative rests firstly on the social, 
environmental and economic importance of tropical forests, and secondly on 
the argument that economic or market incentives (or rather disincentives) for 
forest managers or local forest users are the main drivers of this deforestation 
and degradation. Although it is very difficult to substantiate data on numbers 
of 'forest-dependent' people, the literature comes up with some numbers: for 
example, Molnar et al (2004) state that between one and 1.5 billion of the 
world's poorest people live in and around forests, and 80 per cent of the 
extreme poor (less than $1 per day) depend to some extent on forest 
resources for their livelihoods. These include an estimated 60 million 
indigenous people who value tropical forests for a range of livelihood, spiritual 
and ecological services (Shvidenko et al., 2005).
With the scientific acceptance of climate change, carbon sequestration has 
become the most valuable ecological service of tropical forests. Estimates of 
the proportion of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide due to (mainly 
tropical) deforestation range from 18 to 25 per cent, and over the past 150 
years, forest conversion has contributed an estimated 30 per cent to the 
atmospheric build-up of carbon dioxide. As the Stern (2006) Review points 
out, even 18 per cent is more than the emissions of the global transport 
sector. Forests and their soils hold more carbon than there is in the 
atmosphere. Tropical forests hold particularly high carbon stocks, typically 50 
per cent more per hectare than temperate and boreal forests; more of this is in 
the top metre of soil than in the woody biomass (Shvidenko et al., 2005).
Although outside the papers reported here, the author has experience with some of
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Forests also provide important hydrological functions, although the physical 
relationships are complex, poorly understood and often site specific. However 
payments for watershed protection services (clean water, reduced siltation 
and more controversially prevention of flood damage and enhancement of dry 
season flows) have become significant in several Latin American countries, 
like Mexico, Costa Rica and Colombia (Scherr et al., 2006). Win-win benefits 
are gained when small farmers living in upper watershed areas are 
compensated for sustainable farming practices.
Tropical forests form one of the most biodiverse habitats on earth, and contain 
50-90 per cent of the Earth's terrestrial species (Shvidenko et al., 2005); this 
gene pool includes innumerable natural medicinal elements, known or 
undiscovered, of great importance to the pharmaceutical industry and, more 
importantly, medical science. It is also estimated that up to 75 per cent of 
people in developing countries use traditional medicines, many of them from 
tropical forest ecosystems (Shvidenko et al., 2005). Most importantly, 
biodiversity integrity enables the provision of a range of ecological services.
As regards more tangible forest products, it is estimated that forests globally 
produce about 3.3 billion cubic metres of wood, over 60% of which is used for 
fuel, about 5,000 commercial products, and up to 30-40 per cent of the grass 
and fodder requirements of livestock in many developing countries (Shvidenko 
et al., 2005). Overall the forest sector contributes about 2 per cent of global 
gross domestic product, and is a significant source of employment and foreign 
exchange for many countries, although a problem for forestry is that it 
provides less employment than most other land uses.
An important argument underpinning all the above benefits is inter- 
generational equity, which refers to the right of future generations to enjoy 
similar benefits to the current generation. While forests are clearly valuable to 
society, they are not always more valuable than other land uses. To an 
economist, a forest is a form of capital which can be converted into other
these systems in Honduras, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Nepal and India.
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forms of capital. In practice, conversion can be justifiable to meet socio- 
economic objectives according to the context, for example, when forests are 
abundant and the economy is highly dependent on agriculture. Therefore 
forest economists sometimes use the terms 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' 
deforestation (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 1998). This of course raises the 
question of appropriate for who? The problems of tropical forestry stem from 
its multiple management (or conversion) objectives and stakeholders, and the 
trade-offs between them.
1.3 The 'difficult economies' of SFM and conservation
The evidence of deforestation and forest degradation show quite clearly that 
SFM is not viable in many forest ecosystems. A recent comprehensive survey 
estimated that only 5 per cent of tropical forests are well or 'sustainably1 
managed (ITTO, 2006). According to the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(Shvidenko et al., 2005) and FAO (2005), for the period 2000 to 2005, annual 
tropical deforestation has been 12-13 million hectares, including about six 
million hectares of primary forest, and further large areas are degraded. 
These figures are net, so take account of reforestation, afforestation and other 
categories of 'forest transition', including regrowth of secondary forestry on 
abandoned farmland. A caveat is that there is no clear estimate of the latter, 
although recent reports indicate this is greater than previously thought (Rudel 
et al., 2005). Latin America is the region with the highest net loss (about 4.3 
million hectares) followed by Africa (about 4 million hectares).
In view of the perceived benefits, environmental economists have attempted 
to place economic values on tropical forest conservation. While these 
estimates are based on controversial valuation methodologies and are subject 
to an enormous range of error, they can be influential in high-level policy 
arenas. For example, Pearce et al. (2002: 477) estimated that the net annual 
economic value of tropical forest conservation based only on its non-timber 
values was in a range of US $685-4,500 per hectare, with most of the 
variation depending on carbon values (without these, it would fall to less than 
$100 per hectare). Another often quoted study by Costanza et al. (1997)
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estimated a mean annual value of $1,500 per hectare in the Amazon region, 
excluding forest products and recreation.
However one regards the credibility of such calculations, it is clear that only a 
fraction of the 'real' value of tropical forests is realised or 'captured' - most 
forest values are 'externalities' with no market value. And where there are 
market values, as for timber and non-timber forest products (NTFPs), they 
tend to be low due to policy or institutional failures. For example, illegal or 
poorly regulated logging results in a high supply of timber on domestic 
markets and depresses prices.
This situation is compounded by the biological problem that trees grow slowly 
and in natural forests can take 80-100 years to reach their commercially 
optimal size. The main problem here is the opportunity cost of forestry 
investments over time. This is the compound interest that could be earned on 
the investment. Effectively time is the main cost of forestry, and has a major 
effect on it economic viability. For example, an increase in the discount rate 
from 8 to 12 per cent halved the net present value of sustainable forestry in a 
major economic study reported in Chomitz et al. (2006).
Furthermore, the 'difficult economies' is more acute in more biodiverse forests. 
For example, the economics of timber-based SFM is more difficult in the 
species diverse forests of Latin America and West Africa than for the 
dipterocarp and natural teak forests found in large parts of South-East Asia. 
This is due to diseconomies of scale and because markets for lesser-used 
timber species are relatively undeveloped. SFM also tends to be higher cost 
when local communities are involved. A further problem for natural forest 
hardwoods is the increasing competition from hardwood plantations or even 
chemically treated softwoods.
Underlying the difficult economics of tropical forests is that, since they 
produce a range of good and services, there is a range of interested 
stakeholders. In different contexts, these include indigenous peoples, migrant 
colonist farmers, industrial forestry concessionaires, absentee landowners,
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governments (including forestry and agricultural departments), donors 
(claiming to represent the international community's concern for 
environmental and social objectives), national and international environmental 
or development NGOs, pharmaceutical companies, national and foreign wood 
product processors, exporters, retailers in importing countries, etc. Therefore 
forest management often involves a complex set of trade-offs between 
multiple stakeholders. For this reason, state policies over tropical forests are 
politically rather than technically determined, and forest governance plays a 
key role in the distribution of the benefits between the stakeholders. Political 
economy factors have resulted in policies and institutions that skew the 
benefits to elites or vested interested groups.
A combination of market, policy and institutional failures therefore results in 
the undervaluation (compared to its 'real value' to society) of forest land and 
resources by policy makers, forest users and other stakeholders. Except for 
more remote or inaccessible forests, there is therefore a tendency for them to 
be replaced by alternative land uses. There are a plethora of economic 
studies, for example from Cameroon, Costa Rica, Sumatra and India, showing 
that the returns from even subsistence agriculture far outstrip SFM, which 
typically provides a net annual income of $100-200 per hectare (Chomitz et 
al., 2006). Simply stated, deforestation or degradation happens because it is 
more profitable to fell a tree or forest than to keep it for its long-term value.
Therefore a recent high profile review of the status of tropical forest 
management in 33 countries found that, of the constraints to SFM "probably 
the most important, and the most generally applicable, is that sustainable 
management for the production of timber is less profitable to the various 
parties involved (government, concessionaires and local communities) than 
other possible ways of using the land" (ITTO, 2006:11). How to achieve 
positive 'economic incentives' for forest users or managers to engage in SFM 
or conservation is therefore the main challenge for tropical forests.
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1.4 The beginning of the journey ... and its continuation
I began to explore the theme of economic incentives for SFM and 
conservation in 1990 when granted a one year 'In-Service Training Award' by 
the UK ODA. Part of this year was spent learning about forestry and forest 
policy issues during two terms as a 'recognised student', and in a three month 
'Social and Agroforestry' course, at the Oxford Forestry Institute, University of 
Oxford. I spent the remainder of the year researching PFM and biodiversity 
conservation projects in Honduras, Mexico, Costa Rica and Belize.
During this experience I started investigating two interconnected issues which 
formed the basis of my research for the next 15 years. The first was the 
economic viability of 'SFM 1 and biodiversity conservation, since it was clear 
that the tropical forest ecosystems of Central America were being rapidly 
degraded, and most attempts to manage or conserve forests were failing. The 
second issue was the participation of local users or communities in projects 
promoted by international, state and NGO agencies: I was interested in the 
different ways of promoting participation, and how sustainable this 
participation was. This raised questions such as whether the benefits of PFM 
outweigh the costs, both in the short and long term, how to quantify the 
benefits and costs for local people, how to improve the benefit-cost balance of 
PFM, and how local users balance economic factors with broader social and 
institutional criteria when making land use or livelihood decisions.
This narrative covers 13 publications (listed in Appendix 1) resulting from this 
research journey. This process is still ongoing; I have been invited by Forest 
Trends in 2007 to participate in research to assess the extension of forest 
management certification to ecological services from SFM and conservation. 
And the Editor of the International Forestry Review, an increasingly influential 
journal, has expressed an interest in receiving a paper based on my PhD 
narrative, noting that 'while there are many papers that deal with particular 
aspects of both market-based and non-market based incentives, I feel there is 
a lack of published analysis linking the development of thought overtime 
through to the role of regulatory incentives and forest governance issues. I 
look forward to developing the paper with you' (Appendix 3).
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1.5 Research objectives and hypothesis
The focus of this PhD narrative is my research journey to better understand 
the 'difficult economies' of tropical forestry, especially natural forest 
management in Latin America: six of the 13 publications focus on Latin 
America, one on Ghana, one on Nepal, and five have a more global focus. 
Specifically it seeks to understand the economic incentives of a range of 
stakeholders, but especially of local forest users and industrial forest 
managers, to manage, conserve or degrade natural tropical forests. As a sub- 
theme, I explore the challenges to effective participation of the rural poor in 
the management and conservation of tropical forests.
The research hypothesis can be expressed as follows: the main constraint to 
SFM and conservation of tropical forests is the 'difficult economies' of natural 
forest management and conservation stemming from market, policy and 
institutional failures. These cause an 'undervaluation' of SFM and 
conservation compared to alternative land uses, including unsustainable 
forestry, which results in disincentives for local or industrial forest managers. 
A better understanding of the economic incentives (and disincentives) for key 
stakeholders will lead to more effective projects and policies, and, especially 
for PFM, 'win-win' outcomes.
1.6 Structure
The narrative is organised in three main sections: Introduction, Discussion of 
Publications and Reflective Overview. The second and main section adopts a 
publication by publication approach, with each publication discussed in five 
sub-sections:
  Context, including autobiographical information;
  Methods: presentation of the main data collection methods;
  Originality: discussion of the extent to which the publication, in my view, 
made an original contribution to the literature;
  Reflection and learning: discussion of how the paper contributed both to 
my personal learning and (in my view) to the wider literature;
Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Management and Conservation of Tropical Forests
Michael Richards
10
  Postscript: this discusses how later research by myself or others in the 
same thematic or geographical context reinforced or otherwise informed 
the original publication findings.
The Reflective Overview presents a more discursive and synthesised analysis 
of the publications, and brings together the learning from my publications with 
more recent or seminal literature. This leads to a discussion of key policy 
challenges for the future of tropical forests, and some research 
recommendations. This discussion deliberately goes beyond the scope of my 
papers, including, for example, a discussion of the potential of 'avoided 
deforestation 1 , since this is regarded as an 'incentive' measure of major 
current importance. There is therefore a considerable element of 
generalisation from the published papers in terms of forest type and 
geographical scope. The findings, research recommendations and 
conclusions are most relevant for SFM and conservation of natural forests in 
Latin America, and to a lesser extent in West Africa and montane systems in 
South East Asia, and less relevant to forest systems involving planted trees, 
for which the economics is perhaps less 'complex1 , or for other forest types 
and management arrangements, as discussed in Section 1.1.
The five Appendices are organised as follows:
1. Details of publications, sub-publications and conference presentations 
associated with the main publications;
2. Statements of co-authors;
3. Impact ratings of journals and the number of Google Scholar citations;
4. Book reviews, other references to publications, and letter from the Editor of 
International Forestry Review;
5. The Publications.
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2 DISCUSSION OF PUBLICATIONS
2.1 PFM in Honduras, Mexico and Peru (Publication 1)
Richards, M. 1993. Lessons for Participatory Natural Forest 
Management in Latin America: Case Studies from Honduras, 
Mexico and Peru. Journal of World Forest Resource Management 
7:1-25.
2.1.1 Context
During my ODA 'In-Service Training Award' (1.4), I spent three months in 
Central America in early 1991 researching promising participatory approaches 
to forest management and biodiversity conservation. The time was spent 
primarily on a Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) funded 
project supporting forest management by small pit-sawing cooperatives in 
Northeast Honduras. This was supplemented by short trips to visit PFM and 
biodiversity conservation projects in Southeast Mexico (where I had lived for 
four years, and was very familiar with the context), Costa Rica and Belize.
This paper focuses on three PFM experiences in Latin America: the pit-sawing 
cooperatives of Honduras, the forest 'ejidos' (land reform cooperatives) of the 
'Pilot Forestry Plan' in Quintana Roo, Mexico and the indigenous Yanesha 
Forestry Cooperative in the Palcazu Valley, Peru. A paper specifically on the 
forest ejidos of Mexico was published in the Commonwealth Forestry Review 
(Richards, 1991).
2.1.2 Methods
This publication synthesises primary and secondary data collected in 
Honduras, Mexico and Peru. For Honduras and Mexico, data collection 
methods included semi-structured interviews with farmers, focus groups, 
project staff, forestry department officials and other key informants. I also 
revised sales data, cost accounts and other records. The Peru case study was 
based on secondary data sources and interviews with staff from support
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institutions, and for all three case studies I revised project documents and 
published papers.
2.1.3 Originality
This was one of the first attempts to undertake a comparative social, 
environmental and economic analysis of PFM experiences in Latin America. 
This included an attempt to consider the economic viability of forest 
management (in the case of the Mexico and Honduras case studies), although 
this was more of a 'snapshot' than a thorough economic analysis. At this time 
there was a paucity of micro-economic data on PFM.
2.1.4 Reflection and learning
The paper reveals that a combination of policy, social, institutional and 
biological factors contributed to the relative success of the Mexican 
experience compared to the other two PFM situations. The more positive 
incentives for forest management in Mexico derived from tenure security (the 
ejidos held inalienable property rights established by the Mexican 
Constitution), relative political and social stability, supportive provincial 
government and long-term support by the German aid agency GTZ using 
participatory methodologies. In addition, forest management in Mexico 
seemed to be reasonably viable due to the combination of some high value 
timber species and chicle (Manilkara zapota), an NTFP used in chewing gum.
By contrast, tenure uncertainties and vacillating state policies dominated by 
industrial forestry interests, facilitated by an often corrupt forestry authority, 
prevailed in Honduras; and the second order cooperative which marketed the 
timber supplied by the pit-sawing cooperatives also suffered from inefficiency 
and corruption. In Peru, socio-political instability posed a severe constraint to 
the marketing of timber, so that the community forest enterprise (CFE) was 
hardly able to pay salaries, and had become heavily dependent on donor 
support.
It was also observed that in the case of the Mexican forest ejidos, forest 
management formed part of a broader livelihood mosaic: forestry was
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integrated with maize, honey and cattle production. Mexican ejidatarios (ejido 
members) were first and foremost farmers who saw forestry as a valuable 
complementary activity bringing in income at lean times of year and providing 
greater livelihood security. An early personal realisation was that a key to 
PFM is to recognise and encourage multiple purpose land use rather than by 
promoting a narrow commodity-oriented approach, focusing on timber or a 
specific NTFP. Finally, this first attempt to assess the viability of forest 
management made me realise the complexity of a full economic study of 
SFM, especially the need for reliable biological data to assess long-term 
resource productivity, and estimate the 'with' and 'without' SFM extraction 
levels.
2.1.5 Postscript
Later research (associated with Publications 4, 6, 9, 11 and 12) has provided 
me with various opportunities to monitor the progress of PFM in Honduras and 
Mexico; I also learned that the Peru project was dissolved due to economic 
insolvency. The Honduran project has struggled on in the face of continuing 
policy and tenure uncertainties, ineffective marketing and 'unfair competition' 
from illegal timber, causing most cooperative members to abandon forest 
management or become illegal loggers. The only experience of the three to 
prosper has been the forest ejidos of Quintana Roo, Mexico.
The latter have also faced major problems, including weak markets and over- 
harvesting of mahogany and chicle. Cheap timber imports following the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994 did not help timber prices, 
and another threat was the pro-NAFTA modification of the Mexican 
Constitution in 1992. This opened the way for the sub-division and sale of 
ejido land. In practice however, this has happened only a very modest scale. It 
is significant that the ejiditarios and their families gave significant value to the 
non-market benefits of their forests in the case study conducted for 
Publication 9. A recent study (Bray et al., 2004) reports the development of 
'sustainable landscapes' among the forest ejidos of Quintana Roo in which 
institutional innovations, including the development of extractive reserves for 
chicle production, and forest transition (secondary forest regrowth) are playing
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important roles. The resilience of the Mexican forest ejidos has also been 
helped by the introduction of payments for hydrological services in a 2003 
Forest Law (Scherr et al., 2006).
2.2 Non-timber forest products in Amazonia (Publication 2)
Richards, M. (1993) The Potential of Non-Timber Forest Products 
for Sustainable Natural Forest Management in Amazonia. 
Commonwealth Forestry Review 72 (1): 21-27
\ 
2.2.1 Context
Following my training award year, I spent eight months (November 1991 to 
June 1992) at the Natural Resources Institute (NRI), Chatham. In early 1992, 
NRI was commissioned by ODA to undertake a review of the management 
and commercialisation of NTFPs in the Amazon region. The importance of this 
topic was that some Northern observers had identified major potential win-win 
benefits from the management and commercialisation of Amazonia's plethora 
of NTFPs. An influential paper in Nature (Peters et al., 1989) proposed that 
SFM of NTFPs was a viable and equitable conservation option for large areas 
of the Amazon. But the paper had also come in for criticism by Latin American 
researchers like Homma (1989) (and subsequently Pinedo-Vasquez et al., 
1992) who were more sceptical of these claims. ODA was clearly concerned 
to obtain another view. NRI also published a longer version of the journal 
paper (Richards, 1993).
2.2.2 Methods
The paper was based on revision of grey and published literature, and 
correspondence with key informants, especially social anthropologists and 
botanists based in the USA. It also drew on my observations from a field trip 
to the Bolivian Amazon region in 1990.
2.2.3 Originality
In retrospect, the themes of the paper do not appear original, but at the time it 
was possibly quite forward looking. Firstly, it foreshadows some of the
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principles later embodied in the Sustainable Livelihoods framework (Carney, 
1998) adopted particularly by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID). Thus the paper highlights the livelihood dangers 
associated with a commodity-based approach, particularly the way it can 
narrow the livelihood basis of the family economy and increase vulnerability.
Secondly, the paper warns of the dangers of a market-based approach to 
forest conservation in the context of a weak regulatory framework and 
insecure land tenure. Extractive reserves emerged as a more durable option 
because of their stronger institutional and tenure basis for forest management, 
even though market prospects for the main extractive reserve products, 
rubber and Brazil nuts, were unfavourable. To some extent this foreshadowed 
Joseph Stiglitz's (1998) exhortation to strengthen institutions and regulatory 
frameworks when (or ideally before) promoting market-based approaches.
2.2.4 Reflection and learning
The paper shows that, if left to market forces, forest management based on 
commercial NTFP extraction tends to result in over-exploitation, degradation 
and conversion to other land uses, as well as serious poverty impacts. The 
main personal learning was an increased realisation of the risks of a market 
commodity based approach. I observed that in a weak regulatory and tenure 
context, the forest resource and the poor are highly vulnerable to fluctuations 
in market prices. Higher rewards increase the incentives for previously 
uninterested stakeholder to exert their rent-seeking powers. Also the risks are 
greater when products are traded internationally- local and national markets 
are more stable.
Extractive NTFPs are particularly prone to over-exploitation and resource 
depletion, due to the well documented NTFP 'boom and bust' cycle and the 
potential for destructive harvesting methods (as for timber). More sustainable 
and equitable experiences derived from secure tenure, stronger rights and 
control by local communities, and, in some cases, vertical market integration. 
International market niches like 'fair trade' were sometimes an option, but
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these opportunities were hard to sustain and required long-term donor support 
(finance, training, extension, etc.).
The paper therefore concluded that, without appropriate institutional and 
tenure reforms, the expectations were unrealistically high for market-oriented 
SFM based on NTFP commercialisation. Alternative approaches based on 
regulatory and institutional reform, as well as payments for environmental 
services (PES), were needed to secure win-win outcomes. The extractive 
reserve model seemed to offer most hope.
2.2.5 Postscript
Since 1999, rubber tappers on the extractive reserves of Acre State (Brazil) 
have received PES from the State government as a result of the Chico 
Mendes Law. The extractive reserves model has been consolidated and 
extended as far afield as Mexico (Bray et al., 2004). The durability of the 
extractive reserves model confirms that, at least in the context of NTFP 
extractivism, a stronger institutional and tenure basis combined with a PES 
mechanism has more potential for securing win-win outcomes than a more 
market-based approach - but also requires considerable political will and 
public investment.
A recent research study on the commercialisation of NTFPs in Mexico and 
Bolivia (Marshall et al., 2006) also confirms the need for a livelihoods rather 
than commodity-based approach, as well as the importance of the tenure and 
institutional basis. It found that secure tenure and stable common property 
resource (CPR) systems were key to SFM objectives, but local forest users 
generally only engage with the informal market sector due to entry barriers to 
formal markets (legal and administrative requirements) and lack of market 
information. It observes the potential of niche markets for organic or fair trade 
NTFPs, but also warns that certification costs are a constraint for small-scale 
producers.
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2.3 Incentives for forest management in Ghana (Publication 3)
Richards, M. (1995) The Role of Demand Side Incentives in Fine 
Grained Protection: a case study of Ghana's Tropical High Forest. 
Forest Ecology and Management 78: 225-241
2.3.1 Context
Following my spell at NRI, I felt the need for more field experience in natural 
resource economics. I was fortunately able to obtain this as team leader and 
natural resources economist for the International Institute for Environment and 
Development (IIED) on a 'Study of Incentives for High Forest Management in 
Southern Ghana'. This research project was funded by UK ODA and the 
Danish aid agency DANIDA, and undertaken at the request of the 
International Tropical Timber Organisation (ITTO). This assignment ran from 
August 1992 to July 1993.
2.3.2 Methods
The paper was based on primary data, supported by revision of published and 
grey literature. An economic survey of 17 concessionaires and 16 timber 
processors was conducted using a purposive sampling approach. This 
included analysis of company accounts, and was supplemented by 
questionnaires and key informant discussions. Participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) methods were used to discuss community level issues.
2.3.3 Originality
This paper was quite original, although not unique, in its efforts to trace 
systematically the impacts of key forest sector policies, especially forest 
pricing and trade policies, on stakeholder incentives to manage or degrade 
the forest resource. These stakeholders were concessionaires, timber 
processors, the state forestry department, farmers, forest communities and 
'stool chiefs', the traditional landowning authorities. Most forest land was held 
or managed by the state, represented by the Forestry Department, but 
belonged to communities represented at least symbolically by the stool chiefs.
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It was also innovative in its analysis of the distribution of the 'stumpage value' 
and 'economic rent'3 . By assessing how surplus profit was distributed between 
the stakeholders, it revealed the distributive impacts of forest policies. Since 
forest fees, in the form of log royalties and a plethora of minor charges, were 
very low, a massive fiscal transfer from the public to the private (or industrial) 
sector was identified. Ghana's log export ban exacerbated the undervaluation 
of the forest resource since it resulted in cheap domestic log prices, which in 
turn subsidised timber processors and increased wastage. These findings 
were similar to a seminal study of forest pricing and trade policies in Indonesia 
(Gillis and Repetto, 1988). Mine was one of the first empirical studies in Africa 
to support the Indonesian analysis, and therefore reinforce its policy 
implications. A referee of the journal paper commented that my paper 
confirmed a long-held hypothesis about the impacts of an undervalued forest 
resource stemming from inappropriate forest sector policies.
2.3.4 Learning and reflection
The paper held three main personal lessons. Firstly, it provided evidence that 
trade restrictions, like log export bans, combined with the under-pricing of 
timber from state forestland, results in undervaluation of the forest resource. 
The trade and forest pricing policies caused severe over-capacity and 
inefficiency in Ghana's timber industry, as the cheap timber encouraged 
excess demand, inefficiency and wastage. Another consequence of under- 
pricing state timber was to encourage rent-seeking behaviour- if the state 
does not claim the 'surplus profit' element then vested interest groups will. 
Combined with weak tree rights and tenure for local forest users, this situation 
caused local stakeholders to adopt negative attitudes to the forest resource. 
Thus the incentives for both the 'winners' and 'losers' of state policies were to 
degrade the resource.
A second main lesson, which reinforced my learning from the first two papers, 
was that market-based or demand side incentives are insufficient drivers of
3 Stumpage value represents the standing value of the trees or forest and is 
equivalent to the 'surplus' profit before taxation, while economic rent is the surplus or 
profit after taxation.
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SFM, and must be supported by supply-side or regulatory measures. Trade 
restrictions and forest pricing operate on the demand side, at least for 
concessionaires and millers, since they determine the price of timber and thus 
the industrial demand for it. It was concluded that a more effective legal or 
regulatory framework was needed, especially better 'control at the stump' by 
the Forestry Department, for example, restrictions on cutting high value or 
scarce species, heavier fines, etc. But the problem was the political will 
needed for policies fiercely opposed by vested interest groups - which 
included leading politicians.
In terms of incentives for SFM, it also made me realise that poorly researched 
and designed demand-side incentive mechanisms can send out contradictory 
signals and result in 'perverse incentives'. I concluded that there was no 
alternative to a balanced 'carrots and sticks' approach to SFM in which 
demand-side measures, like forest pricing and trade policies, have a 'fine 
tuning' role.
2.3.5 Postscript
In a study incorporated in Publication 9, I returned to Ghana in 1999 to 
investigate the incentives for cocoa farmers to maintain timber trees in 'off- 
reserve' forest areas4 . This study found that prevailing tree tenure and 
concessionaire policies, combined with weak control, resulted in perverse 
incentives for cocoa farmers as regards timber trees. Although many high 
value timber trees were also good for cocoa due to shade provision and 
nutrient recycling benefits, farmers preferred non-timber shade trees and 
would often destroy timber tree saplings. This was because they received no 
income from the trees they tended, and suffered major uncompensated losses 
to their cocoa farms during logging. It was further evidence of the 
disincentives to local stakeholders stemming from policies favouring the 
timber industry.
4 Ghana has two main sources of timber: state forest reserves where the forest is 
allocated to competing forest concessionaires, and the 'off-reserve' resource 
comprised mainly of trees on farmland, also divided into concession areas.
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I also visited Cameroon briefly in the late 1990s and noted similarities to 
Ghana in terms of both the forestry ecology and political economy. Due to 
various factors, including persistent support from the World Bank and WWF, 
Cameroon has made more progress on forest sector reform, including in 
forest taxation, concession tenure, community rights (including a fair share of 
the 'forest rent1 ), state institutions and the regulatory framework (Chomitz et al. 
2006: 167-170). Important reforms have included concession allocation based 
on competitive bids (auctions) for area-based fees, longer-term concession 
tenure, the introduction of 'performance bonds' encouraging long-term forest 
management, and improved transparency and monitoring. These incentive 
measures are by no means new - most were proposed 15 years ago (Grut et 
al., 1991) - but as in Ghana, vested interests have blocked the reform 
process. It remains to be seen whether there is sufficient political will for 
effective implementation.
2.4. Conservation strategies in Honduras (Publications 4a and 4b)
Richards, M. (1996). Protected Areas, People and Incentives in the 
Search for Sustainable Forest Conservation in Honduras. 
Environmental Conservation 23 (3): 207-217
Richards, M. (1997). Alternative Approaches and Problems in 
Protected Area Management and Forest Conservation in 
Honduras, pp.142-156 in de Groot, J. P. & Ruben, R., eds. 
Sustainable Agriculture in Central America. Basingstoke/ London: 
Macmillan Press; and New York: St Martin's Press. (Papers from 
the 1995 Annual Conference of the Association for European 
Research on Central America and the Caribbean, held Oct. 14-15, 
1995 in Paris, France)
2.4.1 Context
Following the Ghana study and a consultancy on the economics of silvicultural 
interventions in SFM in Amazonia, in December 1993 I started work at the 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI). ODI had obtained a grant from the
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European Commission (EC) entitled 'Managing the Forest Boundary' for 
researching alternative biodiversity conservation strategies. A key interest of 
the research was to compare the traditional 'fences and fines' approach with 
more participatory and market-based approaches. Three of the case studies 
were in Latin America; I supervised studies in Brazil and Guatemala, and 
conducted the study myself in Honduras.
The Honduran fieldwork was conducted in 1994 and a paper presented at the 
1995 Annual Conference of the Association for European Research on 
Central America and the Caribbean; this paper was subsequently reviewed, 
edited and published in a book of the proceedings. I had meanwhile submitted 
a paper to Environmental Conservation. Both publications are presented here 
since, while the journal paper was much more widely cited (19 Google Scholar 
citations), the book chapter was more thoroughly reviewed and edited, and is, 
in my view, a better quality paper.
The Honduran study focused on two contrasting protected areas. The learning 
from this paper can only be appreciated with a short description of them. La 
Tigra National Park is a small, accessible cloud forest with very high market 
and non-market values, and where, theoretically, the market-based and 
participatory approach should have had more success. Situated very close to 
the capital Tegucigalpa, La Tigra supplied 40 per cent of the city's water 
supply, and was a prime area for high value cash crops like coffee, vegetables 
and flowers. Institutionally it was dominated by state agencies with conflicting 
legal mandates. The Rio Platano Biosphere Reserve (RPBR) was large, 
remote and relatively inaccessible. Like La Tigra, it was very important for its 
watershed protection and biodiversity values, but these were less immediate 
to policy makers. It had much lower population and market pressures. Most of 
the conservation and development work was carried out by NGOs in the 
virtual absence of state agencies.




The research for this paper involved five weeks of fieldwork. Discussions were 
conducted with a wide range of stakeholders, including key informants in the 
many state agencies and NGOs working in and around these protected areas. 
Semi-structured interviews were also held with farmers and other 
beneficiaries, local government officials, project staff, donor representatives 
and state policy makers. Many of the key informants were already well known 
to me from my four years residence there. This ensured good access to 
project documents and other secondary data sources. I remained in close 
contact with some key informants, allowing me to update the paper between 
the fieldwork and publication.
2.4.3 Originality
While originality may be hard to establish, this study provided a good 
opportunity to compare the social and institutional viability of conservation 
strategies in two protected areas. The conservation strategies could be 
classified as:
  a regulatory or 'fences and fines' approach (a);
  a more participatory and market-based approach in which the aim was to 
promote conservation incentives through sustainable livelihood options 
linked to the resources of the protected area (b); and
  the development of sustainable farming systems in the buffer zones to 
reduce pressures on the forest resource (c).
Projects combining strategies (b) and (c), and which aim to reconcile 
conservation and development objectives, are known as Integrated 
Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs) in the literature.
2.4.4 Learning
It was found that the regulatory approach (a) suffered in both areas from weak 
governance, lack of resources to police the boundaries, and confusing and 
conflicting institutional and legal frameworks. This included clashes between 
central and local government following a decentralisation law which increased
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the power of municipalities over forestland. This was compounded by tenure 
insecurity following the 1992 Law of Agricultural Modernisation - neo-liberal 
legislation that attempted to create an efficient land market, but caused 
widespread land speculation.
The market-based and participatory approach (b) was also quite unsuccessful 
in both areas, especially for the conservation objectives. For example, in the 
RPBR, tenure insecurity, lack of state support and low market values 
constrained PFM (as found in Publication 1 for the pit-sawing groups in a 
nearby area). For La Tigra, the main problem was that the high market values 
attracted vested interest groups that paid scant attention to the law: it was 
common knowledge that members of the current President's family grew 
coffee and kept cattle in the nuclear zone. Opportunities to build conservation 
incentives on the basis of the hydrological and eco-tourism values in La Tigra 
suffered from the state's interest in the revenue flows. In both areas, a corrupt 
and complacent state forestry authority, combined with the military's 
involvement in nuclear zone policing activities, alienated local populations.
The most promising work in both buffer zones was in the development of 
sustainable farming systems (c) by NGOs like World Neighbours. But while 
this possibly reduced encroachment by small farmers, it did little to deter 
commercial logging, farming and ranching interests. This perhaps reflected 
weak diagnosis of the drivers of encroachment.
The study revealed an urgent need for legal and institutional reform. There 
was little hope for either a regulatory or market-based approach in the 
prevailing policy, legal and institutional framework. For example, confused 
tenure, lack of rights for local communities and weak governance and policing 
meant that the RPBR was an almost open-access resource; market and legal 
pressures favoured forest conversion to 'slash and burn' farming followed by 
ranching. Such pressures limited the scope for participatory approaches to 
conservation, and there was little option but to fall back on a 'fences and fines' 
approach. But with Honduras' macroeconomic problems and state downsizing 
from structural adjustment, resources were woefully inadequate for this.
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More positively, the paper revealed to me the potentially complementary roles 
of state agencies and NGOs in conservation strategies. The former should 
provide a stable institutional and regulatory environment in which risks are 
reduced and (ideally) environmental services compensated, while NGOs are 
better placed to work with communities and farmers.
2.4.5 Postscript
Since 1993, I have returned at regular intervals to both protected areas, 
including for a study of illegal logging in 2001 (11) and in 2003-2004 on a 
DFID research study of the adoption of hillside farming technologies in La 
Tigra's buffer zone. Over the years I have observed some positive trends like 
the empowerment of local government, especially in watershed protection; a 
developing interest in PES options; advances in forest governance, including 
increased transparency; and the 2005 Forest Law which strengthened the 
usufruct rights of local communities so that PFM is now more of an option.
On the other hand, in the RPBR the state governance void has been 
increasingly filled by an 'uncivil society' dominated by illegal loggers and drug 
traffickers; severe macroeconomic problems continue to constrain state efforts 
to police protected areas; and depressed agricultural prices have increased 
forest frontier 'push' pressures. There is little evidence that either the market- 
based or regulatory approach is having a more positive impact now than 12 
years ago.
Recent reviews of the ICDP approach indicate that Honduras' experience is 
not unique, since in general the conservation outcomes of ICDPs have been 
disappointing (Chomitz et al., 2006; GEF, 2006). One issue is the apparent 
assumption in many ICDPs that local communities are the main agents of 
deforestation - if they are not, alternative livelihood options will make little 
difference. A second point is that successful alternative livelihoods would not 
automatically reduce community pressures on forests, since higher incomes 
can accelerate deforestation by making cattle ranching or other land use 
options more affordable (as found in Publication 7).
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2.5 Forest valuation methods and practice (Publication 5)
Richards, M. (1994) Towards Valuation of Forest Conservation Benefits 
in Developing Countries. Environmental Conservation 21 (4): 308-319
2.5.1 Context
My next assignment for ODI was a review of environmental cost-benefit 
analysis, including the use of forest valuation methods, in project and policy 
analysis for the Swiss Development Cooperation, followed by case studies 
applying environmental valuation methods in Bolivia. This review was 
presented at a workshop of donor and NGO decision-makers in Berne in July 
1994, and then written up as a journal paper (also reviewed by James 
Winpenny, the overall project leader). It relates to the main research theme 
since it addresses the market failure problem in the undervaluation of tropical 
forests and their ecosystems. Appropriate valuation can reveal the 'real' value 
of forests, and assist the design of fiscal and other PES mechanisms that 
capture or 'internalise' non-market values and costs, and of policy measures 
to counteract 'extra-sectoral 1 policy biases against the forest sector.
2.5.2 Methods
This paper was based on an extensive literature review of the theory and 
application of economic valuation methods to tropical forestry and land use 
change situations, especially forest conservation.
2.5.3 Originality
While this paper was not at all original, I felt it made a useful contribution to 
the literature by making a complex topic accessible to a largely non-economist 
audience, including policy makers, donors, state and NGO advisors. This was 
achieved through a clearly structured presentation of the underlying concepts 
of economic valuation and of the valuation methods with case study 
examples. The paper considered the implications of the experience of forest 
valuation methods in terms of their reliability, cost, and intelligibility of the
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valuation methods to decision-makers. This may have helped policy makers 
understand the potential, as well as limitations, of these valuation methods.
2.5.4 Learning
This review helped me realise that the main challenge for reliable economic 
valuation is less to do with the valuation methods and more about 
specification and quantification of the physical relationships. Hydrological 
impacts in particular are often poorly understood and complex, and require 
long-term research studies. Also some benefits are inherently uncertain, for 
example, the current and future genetic values of biodiversity. It also helped 
me appreciate the importance of prioritising benefit valuation according to a 
range of criteria, for example: the relative importance of the benefits to 
stakeholders, the reliability of the valuation method, the cost of applying it 
(some methods are very data intensive) and the acceptability of the method to 
policy makers.
Another lesson was that triangulation and sensitivity analysis are essential. 
This is again due to technical specification problems, but also because the 
tendency is for different valuation methods to produce significantly different 
results. Unit values (prices) also vary from year to year. It is therefore better to 
present the results of valuation studies as a range of likely values rather than 
as a single figure. Also rather than attempt a 'total economic value' estimation, 
it is better to focus on the most important economic values, starting with the 
market and subsistence values of forest products, and then only attempt to 
value what is necessary to inform a specific policy or project decision. Finally, 
it made me realise that the valuation of non-market benefits is as much an art 
as a science, but creativity must be kept within the bounds of plausibility or the 
art becomes discredited.
2.5.5 Postscript
My efforts with co-authors to develop a toolbox for assessing stakeholder 
incentives in PFM (9), and other attempts to value non-market benefits have 
increased my scepticism of some of the non-market valuation methods in a 
tropical forestry context. The use of sophisticated economic methods, which
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often forms part of a doctorate, can disguise faulty data and a weak 
understanding of physical relationships. And they are usually too expensive to 
apply in tropical forestry situations where budgets and time are limited.
While contingent valuation methods can have an important role in valuing 
some ecological services, they tend to work better when the benefit or service 
is relatively homogenous and well understood (e.g., clean water). My 
experience has been that they work less well in a tropical forestry context. For 
local forest users, the construction of hypothetical scenarios necessary for 
contingent valuation can be confusing, is sometimes unethical and probably 
results in erroneous numbers. From a policy perspective, it is probably more 
reliable to get the primary stakeholders to rank the importance of non-market 
benefits rather than attempt to place financial values on them.
2.6 Common property regimes and indigenous forest management in 
Latin America (Publications 6a and 6b)
Richards, M. (1997) Common Property Resource Institutions and 
Forest Management in Latin America. Development and Change 
28(1): 95-117
Richards, M. (2006). Institutional and Economic Issues in the 
Promotion of Commercial Forest Management in Amerindian 
Societies, pp.181-192. In Posey, D.A. and Balick, M.J., eds. Human 
Impacts on Amazonia. The Role of Traditional Ecological 
Knowledge in Conservation and Development. New York: 
Columbia University Press
2.6.1 Context
Over the 1994-1996 period I was involved in a major research study for the 
UK ODA Rural Resources and Poverty Research Programme. My task was to 
assess forest sector institutional change in Latin America. This involved 
various inter-connected studies, including an analysis of changes in national 
forestry authorities (unpublished ODI paper); decentralisation and privatisation
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policies in Mexico and Costa Rica (Richards and Davies, 1996); a review of 
technical, policy and institutional issues in colonisation zones (see 2.7); and 
an assessment of common property resource or regime (CPR) institutions, the 
subject of these two papers and an ODI briefing paper (Richards, 1997).
Over this period I was also involved in several ODA project cycle missions 
and other consultancies which allowed me to complement my reading of the 
literature with field observations. These included consultancies to the Brazilian 
Amazon, mainly in Para State, a project design mission focusing on protected 
area management in the Bolivian Amazon, and a mid-term review of a project 
to develop sustainable livelihood options for colonist farmers, also in Para 
State.
The second book chapter version (6b) derives from a presentation I gave at a 
1998 Conference entitled 'Human Impacts on the Environments of Brazilian 
Amazonia: Does Traditional Ecological Knowledge have a Role in the Future 
of the Region?' This was organised by the Centre for Brazilian Studies, 
University of Oxford. The long delay in publication of selected Conference 
papers was due to the untimely death of Professor Darrell Posey, the 
Conference director and main editor of the planned book, in 2001. It was only 
in 2004 that it was decided to recommence the process of editing and 
publishing selected Conference papers.
2.6.2 Methods
The papers were based on an extensive published and grey literature review, 
combined with observations from field assignments in Latin America from 
1991 to 1996. They also drew on insights from my earlier research, including 
that associated with Publications 1, 2 and 4. The later book chapter version 
also benefited from research undertaken for Publications 7 and 8.
2.6.3 Originality
I regard the Development and Change article as my most original and 
important paper. While there was an extensive literature on common property 
resource (CPR) issues, little of it (at least in English) focused on natural
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resource management in Latin America. It therefore filled a gap in the 
literature. While not original, my analysis of the implications of the clash 
between indigenous and market economic incentives has been seen as 
significant by some observers, since it highlights the dangers of a market-led 
approach to SFM and conservation for indigenous groups. For example, it 
was cited by Dr David Kaimowitz, then Director General of the Centre for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR), in his keynote presentation at the 
2004 International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) 
Conference (see Appendix 3).
The book chapter particularly focuses on the appropriateness and viability of 
European models of 'classical forest management', involving sustained yield 
silvicultural and management practices. This model has been promoted in 
various parts of Latin America by donors and international NGOs. This paper 
points out the links between institutional uncertainty, risk and the economic 
viability of market-based forest management for indigenous groups. As well as 
the clash of indigenous and market incentives, other risk factors include a lack 
of market and technical information, pressures to adopt unfamiliar 
administrative and organisational procedures, and international market 
volatility for forest products, especially NTFPs. Higher risk translates into 
higher discount rates, and this directly reduces the viability of SFM, as do the 
often high transaction costs of PFM projects. It is therefore unsurprising that 
there are few enduring examples of 'classical' timber-oriented forest 
management by Amerindian groups, except where there is continuing donor 
or international NGO support.
2.6.4 Learning
The main contribution of these two papers was to highlight the clash between 
traditional and market incentives for CPR-based PFM in Amerindian societies. 
The essence of this clash is that market economy incentives, based on 
concepts like profit maximisation and competitiveness, tend to jar with 
indigenous economic systems based on cosmological world views and 
reciprocity. A key objective of indigenous resource management systems is to 
make gifts and maintain reciprocity, and it is sometimes considered anti-social
Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Management and Conservation of Tropical Forests
Michael Richards
30
to accumulate wealth. Market transactions erode such beliefs, remove 
traditional checks on extractive practices and break down the 'gift economy' at 
the heart of CPR management. An intergenerational clash has also been 
observed.
This leads to a questioning of the assumptions behind some donor and state 
policies, including market-led PFM and resource privatisation. For example, 
the neo-liberal rationale for privatising CPRs (now less popular than in the 
1990s) came from the conclusion that CPR systems were being eroded by 
commercial and demographic pressures perse, and that this was inevitable 
due to 'free-riding' problems. But this stemmed from an erroneous 
interpretation of Hardin's (1968) 'tragedy of the commons' thesis - it was 
erroneous because it insufficiently distinguished between CPR and open 
access regimes.
My paper reveals a more complex picture of CPR erosion: the consistent 
evidence is that this has been induced by external policy and institutional 
factors combined with commercial and demographic pressures. There are 
also many examples of CPR institutions responding positively to market 
pressures or opportunities. It is logical that if state policies and legislation are 
key to the erosion of CPRs, they can help strengthen them. But the failure to 
properly research and explain these processes has led to resource 
privatisation and negative environmental and equity outcomes. Thus for some 
observers it is more accurate to talk about the 'tragedy of the non-commons'.
It is not just the clash of traditional and market incentives which is problematic 
when indigenous groups with CPR regimes adopt a market-oriented strategy, 
and especially if they try to access international markets. Other problems 
include the volatile nature of international commodity markets, especially of 
NTFPs (see 2.2), the difficulty of meeting quality and quantity (continuity) 
demands and the need for new administrative systems. The paper also 
reaffirmed my conviction (as in Publications 1 and 2) of the need for a more 
holistic livelihoods perspective when promoting PFM. This research also 
helped me understand a flaw in the 'market logic' that a forest is more likely to
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survive when it is 'given value by the market'. In particular market-based 
strategies overlook the possibility that non-market values provide stronger 
conservation incentives. The book chapter version goes further by suggesting 
that, in view of the risks involved in market-based SFM, there is an ethical 
question to donors and international NGOs that encourage indigenous 
societies down this route.
This analysis therefore made me interested in exploring 'alternative' or non- 
market approaches to conservation that are more based on an indigenous 
reciprocity-based logic. This could involve, for example, donor and state 
support for indigenous rights, political institutions and social infrastructure 
(health, education, etc.) in exchange for a commitment to conservation, 
openness to scientific research and some recreational or tourism access (as 
in the case of one long-running EC project in the Colombian Amazon). But 
such approaches do not sit easily with neo-liberal policies and political 
economy realities.
2.6.5 Postscript
CPR-based forestry in Latin America has endured in various forms, for 
example, in Mexico (forest ejidos), Brazil (extractive reserves), Guatemala 
(community concessions) and Colombia (indigenous reserves), although not 
without considerable donor support. This shows that indigenous CPR regimes 
are capable of survival with appropriate support and policies, especially in the 
area of property rights. Other sources also suggest that underlying incentives 
are different for local and especially indigenous communities. For example, a 
recent World Bank study observes that ceteris paribus indigenous forest 
ownership is associated with significantly lower deforestation; possible 
explanations include that "indigenous people place a higher value on 
conservation than outside colonists, use more benign and appropriate 
technologies for land and forest management, or have less contact with 
markets" (Chomitz et al., 2006: 172). Scherr et al. (2004a) also observe that 
indigenous forest managers usually harvest less than the legal allowable cut.
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Official agencies and some governments are now more supportive of CPR 
systems as a means of achieving conservation and welfare objectives. This is 
reflected by the trend towards devolution of control to indigenous and other 
communities over forest resources - the area of developing country forests 
owned or administered by communities doubled from 1990 to 2005 to about a 
quarter of the total forest area in developing countries (Molnar et al., 2004). 
The latter source also reported a study comparing 80 indigenous reserves and 
19 state-funded protected areas in Amazonia, showing that the former were 
much more cost-effective in achieving conservation outcomes.
With the increased awareness of the social and environmental costs of 
resource privatisation, and of the inefficiency (high cost) of the 'fences and 
fines' approach, there is growing support for indigenous conservation 
strategies (Molnar et al., 2004). For the future, it is essential to monitor and 
assess how indigenous institutions and incentives respond to emerging PES 
markets, and to provide the necessary legal, judicial, technical and 
institutional support for equitable and sustainable outcomes.
2.7 Stabilising the Amazon frontier (Publication 7)
Richards, M. (1997) Missing a Moving Target? Technological 
Change on the Amazon Frontier. ODI Research Study. Overseas 
Development Institute, London
2.7.1 Context
This book and an ODI briefing paper (Richards, 1996) emerged from the 
same ODA research study as Publication 6. It addresses forest conservation 
in terms of how to slow the advance of the agricultural frontier, while 
recognising that colonist farming is not an underlying cause of deforestation 
(Contreras-Hermosilla, 2000). There was strong interest in this theme in the 
1990s in view of the perceived win-win potential of colonist stabilisation 
programmes. For example, the G-7 'Pilot Programme to Conserve the 
Brazilian Rain Forest', which is still ongoing, has received major support from
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multilateral (especially the EC) and bilateral donors; another major initiative 
was the UNDP 'Alternatives to Slash and Burn' Amazon research programme.
This publication was also informed by my visits to colonisation areas in Brazil 
and Bolivia, already mentioned in 2.6.1. I also supervised a case study of 
colonist farmer organisation and agroforestry, the Reflorestamento Economico 
Consorcionado e Adensado (RECA) project, Acre State, Brazil in 1994 (4). 
The book also built on my understanding developed in Publications 4 and 6.
2.7.2 Methods
The book is based on an extensive published and grey literature review, 
including many programme and project reports, and personal observations 
from fieldwork in colonisation zones in Brazil and Bolivia. During these visits I 
held many informal interviews with Brazilian and Bolivian farmers, NGO and 
state project staff, extension workers, researchers and policy makers.
2.7.3 Originality
This book aimed to better understand technological, institutional and policy 
options for stabilising colonist farmers in Latin America, especially in the 
Amazon region. Its use of a micro-economic incentives framework to assess 
the constraints and potential for land use change at the frontier was probably 
not original, but it was atypical of most colonisation zone literature. The book 
explains the rationality and dynamics of colonist farmer decision-making in 
response to changing relative resource scarcity in a 'maturing1 frontier, an 
evolving institutional and policy framework, and in pursuance of a colonist 
goal of accumulating sufficient capital to live closer to social infrastructure.
The book argues that stabilisation programmes have largely ignored or 
misunderstood colonist farmer incentives, and been driven by technologically- 
based approaches in which the aim has been to intensify land use on suitable 
soil types. They therefore 'missed a moving target' and had disappointing 
impacts. As pointed out by Dr Katrina Brown (University of East Anglia) in her 
review of the book (Appendix 3):
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'One conclusion is that "policy and institutionally-based approaches 
are likely to be more cost-effective at influencing land-use practices 
than technologically-based approaches, because land use practices 
are a response to prevailing farm-level incentives, rather than the 
relative availability of different sorts of technology" (p.69). Does this 
constitute a radical shift in the emphasis of current development 
projects in the region I wonder?' (Brown 1998:156).
2.7.4 Learning
The assumption is made at the outset that colonist farmers are rational 
decision-makers in the use of their scarce family resources (labour, capital 
and land) to achieve a less precarious life for their families. It is observed that 
the relative scarcity of these resources or production factors changes as the 
frontier evolves, the literature having identified three main stages of frontier 
development:
  the 'early pioneer' stage, when the forest is still fairly intact;
  the 'emerging market economy' stage when most abandonment occurs;
  the 'closing frontier' stage when agriculture and ranching are dominant.
Appropriate farm or forest management practices and polices aim at a 
'moving target' in terms of the evolving frontier and relative factor scarcity. For 
example, overtime land becomes more scarce and expensive, while the 
availability of capital and family labour gradually increases (e.g., families are 
usually smaller in the early pioneer stage). As the frontier ages, there is 
evolving tenure security, state and NGO presence, extension and credit 
support, social infrastructure development, etc.
But most colonist stabilisation programme have seen the main challenge to be 
how to match intensive agricultural technologies with the soil conditions in 
order to raise land productivity. Land intensification however requires more 
labour, capital (or credit), tenure security, agricultural extension and market 
access, and is therefore not feasible at the early pioneer stage. The labour 
constraint to intensification was particularly underestimated.
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Intensification becomes more feasible when family size and land values rise, 
there is state/NGO support for tenure, credit and extension services, nearby 
markets for farm products and risks fall (risk is a major determinant of colonist 
decision-making). On the other hand, a constraint to more intensive land use 
at the later frontier stage is reduced soil fertility. These factors place a 
premium on soil-improving technologies, like cover crops, that simultaneously 
increase the returns to land and labour. In the later frontier stage, resource- 
intensive agroforestry and perennial crop options, as well as secondary forest 
management, become more viable livelihood strategies.
Also any stabilisation strategy needs to factor in the capital accumulation 
objectives of colonists. The main colonist strategy is to buy (or colonise) 
cheap forest land and sell it (deforested) to other small farmers or cattle 
ranchers. And in the absence of a banking system, cattle are a very 
convenient means of storing capital. They are particularly attractive when land 
is abundant and labour scarce (as in the early pioneer stage). The main 
constraint to cattle farming is capital availability. Therefore either raising 
agricultural productivity or providing credit tends to accelerate deforestation 
since it enables colonists to buy cattle, thereby making the 'deforestation 
cycle' more profitable and speeding up the whole process.
In terms of the overall research hypothesis, a key learning point was 
understanding the economic and social opportunity costs5 of 'sustainable' land 
use options. In (economic) theory, each colonist farmer has a switchover point 
when a decision is made to move from an existing piece of land to a new plot, 
and this is determined by the relative profitability of the two pieces of land. In 
order to reduce the opportunity cost of staying on the first plot, the priorities 
should be, on the one hand, secure land tenure and encouragement of local 
support organisations (e.g., local NGOs supplying agricultural extension, 
credit and marketing services), and on the other hand, policy measures to 
reduce the attractiveness of cattle farming and other non-sustainable land use
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options (e.g., differential land use taxation has been tried in Brazil). A 'pro- 
poor1 strategy would be the provision of education6 and health services at the 
early pioneer phase, since this reduces the desire to move on.
But strategies which reduce the opportunity costs of colonist stabilisation also 
increase the 'pull' of the frontier. It is therefore important to improve 
employment opportunities and social services in colonist origin areas (e.g., 
Northeast Brazil). This brings us back to the underlying causes of frontier 
colonisation; what happens at the frontier depends on social and economic 
conditions in the rest of the economy.
The book also discusses the potential for PFM. This appears to be highest at 
the early pioneer stage since the forest is more intact, and it is less labour and 
capital intensive than farming options. For colonists, PFM for timber is more 
likely than for NTFPs, since the former is less knowledge and labour intensive; 
also low returns to labour from NTFP extraction makes it unattractive. On the 
other hand, timber-based PFM is more demanding in terms of institutional, 
tenure and marketing support, which is scarce during the early pioneer phase, 
colonists are not naturally inclined to form cooperative institutions, and in 
frontier areas the plentiful supply of clearance timber depresses prices. The 
predominant view among colonists, in contrast to indigenous groups, is that 
forests are land reserves for conversion. Also colonists tend to prefer more 
open landscapes. There are therefore few cases of PFM involving colonist 
farmers.
2.7.5 Postscript
Two subsequent studies of frontier deforestation show an even more complex 
situation than presented in 'Missing a Moving Target'. An econometric study of 
deforestation on Ecuador's Amazon frontier by Wunder (2000) and a major
5 The opportunity cost can be defined here as the net income foregone as a result of 
not pursuing the most viable alternative land use.
6 The forest conservation impacts of education in the Bolivian Amazon have been 
studied by Godoy and Contreras (2001). Since 1987, the author has been involved in 
a successful and rapidly expanding rural education programme in Honduras oriented 
to sustainable livelihoods, including in areas near Rio Platano Biosphere Reserve (4).
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review by Angelsen & Kaimowitz (2001) show that any change in productivity, 
relative factor cost or product price can have unforeseen impacts depending 
on the combination of a range of forest and extra-sectoral factors. They show 
the danger of labour-saving agricultural technologies that result in surplus 
labour being invested in forest degrading activities. The prime example is 
'push-factor' colonisation resulting from mechanised soybean cultivation in 
Bolivia and Brazil, which has grown from almost zero in 1970 to 117,000 
square kilometers by 2006 (Chomitz et al., 2006). Secondly, R&D in 
agricultural productivity ceteris paribus increases the profitability gap with 
SFM, and therefore increases the profitability of the colonist's deforestation 
cycle (as do new roads). But if a productivity improvement leads to increased 
wages, this can increase the opportunity cost of forest degrading activities and 
slow deforestation. Thirdly, when the labour supply to frontier areas is elastic 
(i.e., labour is available to take up new employment opportunities), any project 
or development near the frontier increases frontier pull.
These books have led me to a revised view that the only safe technological 
option is more labour-intensive agriculture well away from the frontier, and 
ideally in colonist origin areas. In fact almost any frontier technological, policy 
or institutional initiative is risky in that it is likely to increase the frontier pull 
factor. Poverty considerations however make this an indefensible policy 
stance. This research again shows that win-win outcomes from forestry based 
projects or policies are elusive; they are more likely to happen from less 
visible 'extra-sectoral' actions, e.g., improvement of employment and social 
conditions in colonist source areas. However Brazil is developing a promising 
market-based approach to frontier conservation through its system of 
Transferable Forest Protection Obligations' (Chomitz et al., 2006:181-182). 
This is a 'cap and trade' system in which landowners with less than the legal 
minimum (20 per cent in Southern states and 80 per cent in 'Legal Amazonia') 
of their landholding under forest pay the opportunity cost of conservation of 
landholders with more than the legal minimum. There is therefore a strong 
incentive for landowners to increase their forest areas.
Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Management and Conservation of Tropical Forests
Michael Richards
38
A theme not covered in my book is the increasing evidence of natural 'forest 
transition 1 in many colonisation zones (Rudel et al, 2005). This is when 
deforestation results in a scarcity of wood and other forest products, causing 
prices to rise and resulting in secondary forest regrowth on abandoned 
farmland, especially pasture. This has occurred on a relatively modest scale in 
the Amazon region compared to Asia, where considerable environmental and 
livelihood benefits are reported (Mather, 2007). Finally as a footnote to the 
observation that there are few cases of colonist farmers undertaking PFM, in 
the Bolivian case study associated with Publication 9, a group of colonist 
farmers abandoned PFM once their objective of secure property rights had 
been achieved.
2.8 Innovative incentive mechanisms for SFM (Publication 8)
Richards, M. (2000) Can Sustainable Tropical Forestry be Made 
Profitable? The Potential and Limitations of Innovative Incentive 
Mechanisms. World Development 28 (6): 1001-1016
2.8.1 Context
From 1997 to 1999 the ODI forestry group received a major grant from the 
European Commission to assess EU tropical forestry aid policies. Under this 
grant, I was asked to review the potential of 'innovative financing and 
incentive mechanisms' for SFM and conservation. This resulted in a joint 
ODI/EC paper entitled 'Internalising the Externalities of Tropical Forestry: A 
Review of Innovative Financing and Incentive Mechanisms' (Richards, 1999). 
The World Development paper and an ODI briefing paper (Richards and 
Moura Costa, 1999) were drawn from the longer report. This review paper 
also provided me with an opportunity to synthesise my understanding at the 
time of the role of economic incentives in SFM and conservation.
2.8.2 Methods
This paper was based mainly on an extensive literature review, supported by 
field observations on the progress of SFM and conservation in Latin America 
and Ghana.




Since this paper was based on a literature review its originality is limited, but I 
think it made a significant contribution to the literature. The longer version of 
the paper was distributed to all participants of the United Nations Forum for 
Forest (UNFF) Inter-Sessional Workshop on Financing of Sustainable Forest 
Management (11-13 October 1999, London). I think a contribution of the 
paper was to help clarify some of the issues through a clear structure, 
including its classification of innovative incentive mechanisms (I I Ms) and the 
criteria used for assessing their potential. The IIMs were classified into three 
main approaches:
  Non-market based transfer payments (sub-divided into domestic and 
international mechanisms);
  Market-based approaches;
  Property rights approaches.
This classification has been used by subsequent authors, like Verweij (2002). 
The criteria for assessing the potential of IIMs, more apparent in the longer 
paper (Richards, 1999), were:
  the extent to which they tackle policy and market failures;
  whether they are market-based and therefore 'internalise' the externalities;
  the capacity and willingness to pay of beneficiaries;
  the level of political will needed to implement them;
  their technical and administrative complexity.
I also think that Table 2 of the paper (p.1012) was a useful adaptation of a 
table that first appeared in Lampietti and Dixon (1995). This is a matrix 
showing the distribution of benefits from different forest types between local, 
corporate, national and global stakeholders. This is helpful for thinking about 
the capacity and willingness of different stakeholders to pay for different types 
of benefits. The paper was also progressive in arguing the logic of a 'global 
negotiating table' for SFM and conservation.




Building on Publication 7, a major personal learning point was the importance 
of 'extra-sectoral' policy drivers of deforestation. As already discussed, SFM is 
unlikely when there are easier and quicker profits from unregulated logging, 
ranching or unsustainable cash crops. These 'easy profits' are often due to 
new roads to forested areas, farm subsidies and other extra-sectoral policies. 
Another problem is land tenure legislation that encourages land speculation or 
clearance to establish property rights. The paper therefore argues that for 
SFM and conservation, extra-sectoral policies are at least as important as 
forest sector policies. Policy implications include promotion of off-farm 
employment, labour-intensive agriculture away from the frontier, and human 
and social capital formation in rural areas (Southgate, 1998). But the 
macroeconomic and social development imperatives behind 'extra-sectoral' 
policies, not to mention vested interests in the status quo, make it very difficult 
to influence these policies in favour of tropical forests. Also few studies have 
assessed the environmental costs of such policies.
Thus a major emphasis of the paper is on how to reduce the opportunity costs 
of SFM. It therefore stresses the interdependence of supply and demand 
measures in promoting SFM and conservation (building on most previous 
publications). Increased demand due to a policy measure, like removal of a 
log export ban, increases the stumpage or standing value of forests, and 
increases the returns to both SFM and illegal logging. But the problem for 
most tropical countries is the political will and administrative capacity needed 
for effective forest governance and regulation. Also the 1990s witnessed 
major 'state downsizing' imposed by structural adjustment policies.
The paper also stresses the need for global governance since international 
regulatory agreements create demand and 'willingness to pay' for the public 
good benefits of SFM and conservation. The Kyoto Protocol of the UN Climate 
Change Convention is the main example of this, although for tropical countries 
only planted trees are currently included. Biodiversity is another public good 
for which global governance holds the key to creating market-based PES 
mechanisms, like tradable development rights, which would compensate the
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opportunity cost values. But the UN Convention for Biological Diversity has 
failed to develop a global regulatory approach since the public good values of 
biodiversity are less well understood and appreciated, as well as due to 
national sovereignty concerns.
The paper also found that fiscal market-based instruments have high potential 
for SFM since, like PES, they 'internalise the externalities', but that it is difficult 
to get the tax levels right and they can be administratively complex. This was 
also a problem for other IIMs like 'performance bonds'. Therefore, the paper 
argues, the emphasis should be firstly on improving the regulatory framework 
and influencing extra-sectoral policies, as well as promoting the global 
governance agenda. It is sometimes forgotten that effective regulations will 
'internalise the externalities'. But all these measures face national and 
international political economy constraints so that few countries have made 
significant progress. Also in spite of the paper's title, it was found that many of 
the urgent measures were not particularly innovative.
2.8.5 Postscript
Since this paper was written, the main advances have been in PES and, to a 
lesser extent, forest governance. Recent years have seen the development of 
national PES programmes in Costa Rica and Mexico, the growth of voluntary 
carbon and biodiversity offset markets, and several programmes in Latin 
America involving watershed management payments to forest managers by 
downstream beneficiaries (Scherr et al., 2006). These PES mechanisms have 
been driven mainly by NGO-led pressures for corporate social responsibility, 
and the desire of 'green 1 individuals to minimise their carbon footprint, 
although companies are increasingly motivated by the realisation that stricter 
emission regulations and/or carbon taxes are on the agenda.
While tropical 'carbon forestry1 is still marginalised in the Kyoto Protocol, there 
is currently (January 2007) considerable discussion about the potential for 
forest conservation - or what is known as 'avoided deforestation' (AD) or 
'reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) in the 
Kyoto discussions. The Stern Review reported that reducing deforestation,
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which contributes at least 18 per cent of man-made carbon emissions, is a 
"highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and has the 
potential to offer significant reductions fairly quickly" (Stern, 2006:537). This 
cost-effectiveness stems from the observation that the land use opportunity 
cost of forest conservation7 is often very low compared to the carbon storage 
value. The proponents of AD argue that although the reduction in carbon 
emissions might not be permanent, it would provide a vital 'breathing space' 
for technological and fiscal solutions to effect major reductions in industrial 
and energy emissions.
What is attractive to this observer is that AD involves national programmes to 
reduce the rate of deforestation, due to the 'leakage'8 problem of individual 
projects. Thus AD will only happen by tackling the policy and governance 
failures driving deforestation; on the other hand it may not be cheap or 
equitable9 . There is considerable discussion about whether AD should be 
included in the Clean Development Mechanism (COM) of the Kyoto Protocol, 
so that industrialised countries are able to purchase AD credits to set against 
their emission targets. The main fear is that the carbon market will be flooded, 
resulting in a price that is too low for a range of carbon mitigation options. But 
another way of looking at this is that AD would enable stricter emission caps 
by industrialised countries since it would allow a simultaneous supply and 
demand increase. Other AD proposals include Brazil's proposal for AD 
payments by industrialised countries based on the average market value of 
carbon, and a separate market for forest credits (Dresner et al., 2006). 
There is insufficient space here to discuss various other complex issues and 
challenges for AD like the setting of baselines and potential perverse 
incentives, measurement and accounting methodologies, 'additionality',
7 This varies from a few dollars per hectare for extensive ranching to about $1,000 
per hectare for mechanised soya cultivation or 'one-off logging, while a tropical forest 
typically releases 500 tonnes of carbon dioxide (Chomitz et al., 2006). Assuming a 
market value of $10 per tonne of carbon dioxide, the forest carbon value would be at 
least five times more than the land use opportunity cost value.
8 Leakage happens when reduced emissions from lower deforestation in one place 
are cancelled out by increased emissions from deforestation somewhere else.
9 The equity impacts of climate change and its mitigation options are of particular 
interest, having researched this topic (Richards, 2003).
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'impermanence', leakage and the complexities of the COM which result in very 
high transaction costs, but which ensure 'environmental integrity' and a 
'fungible', tradable commodity. The general view (Chomitz et al., 2006, 
Ebeling, 2006, Stern, 2006) seems to be that these challenges are 
surmountable if there is sufficient political will.
As regards other PES options, an important realisation is that if they are not 
market or regulatory-based, they tend not to be cost-effective. For example, in 
Mexico's system of payments for hydrological services it is reported that only 
10 per cent of the money went to the 20 per cent most threatened forests 
(Chomitz et al., 2006). Most payments have gone to forests not at risk, and 
therefore have not achieved 'additionally'. Auctioning of PES would ensure 
better targeting and efficiency. By contrast, a new PES mechanism with a 
clear regulatory and market basis is Brazil's system of Transferable Forest 
Protection Obligations (see 2.7.5). This tradable development rights system 
could prove to be a prototype for other national or global regulatory-based 
PES programmes.
On the governance side, the main developments have been (a) the Forest 
Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) process, involving regional 
agreements to tackle forest crime, and (b) higher forest product import 
standards in Europe through state procurement policies which specify that 
only legal or certified timber will be used, and 'code of conduct' agreements by 
some timber trade importers (Fripp and Roby, 2006). Eight European 
countries had public timber procurement policies in place by September 2006. 
But most tropical countries still suffer from weak forestry institutions and 
ineffective regulation, even allowing for improved export sector performance in 
some Latin American countries like Brazil and Bolivia.
In sum, market, policy and institutional failure problems remain very serious, 
and the conclusions of my 2000 paper still seem valid. There are however 
promising developments in some mid-income countries in PES mechanisms, 
and 'compensated reduction' or AD has enormous potential if political 
agreement can be reached in the Climate Change Convention. As this extract
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from a proposal for 'compensated reduction' of deforestation indicates, a more
equitable 'global negotiating table' may be getting closer:
"Compensated reduction is a voluntary mechanism that offers tropical 
countries access to substantial market incentives for reducing 
emissions, while respecting their sovereignty in selecting means and 
investing returns. It is in essence a strategy for an equitable global 
distribution of the costs and benefits for reducing deforestation." 
(Santilli et al., 2005:273).
2.9 Economic stakeholder analysis of PFM (Publication 9)
Richards, M., Yaron, G. and Davies, J. (2003). Stakeholder 
Incentives in Participatory Forest Management. A Manual for 
Economic Analysis. London: ITDG Publishers
2.9.1 Context
The assumption has too often been made that local people will naturally 
participate in PFM projects, but in practice, participation has been patchy and 
often dependent on subsidies, resulting in problems when these are 
withdrawn. In the mid-1990s, UK ODA conducted an extensive review of its 
PFM projects. One of the findings was insufficient understanding of the 
incentives for local forest users to participate in PFM as opposed to other land 
use and livelihood options, and that this contributed to disappointing 
outcomes. Thus the review identified the "need for further exploration of the 
type and level of incentives necessary to secure involvement" and for "more 
rigorous use of economic methods, particularly as design tools. Policy makers 
and other stakeholders also need accurate assessments of who wins and who 
loses ... and what the costs and benefits are" (ODA, 1996: 20).
In response to this situation, I made a successful application to the DFID 
Forestry Research Programme (FRP) to investigate the potential of economic 
methods and tools to improve the analysis of stakeholder incentives in PFM. 
This book represents the main output of this research study, conducted mainly 
between 1998 and 2001.




The book was based on a combination of primary and secondary data 
collection in the five case studies of PFM situations in Bolivia, Ghana, Mexico, 
Nepal and Zimbabwe, and an extensive literature review. It should be noted 
that the aim of the case studies was to generate, within normal donor and 
project time frames, reliable and cost-effective economic data on PFM 
incentives. Due to the time and 'cost-effectiveness' constraints, there was 
therefore high reliance on the use of memory recall methods, especially 
household surveys, key informant interviews and PRA methods. This typically 
resulted in four to six weeks of fieldwork by small interdisciplinary teams of 
international and national consultants. This compares to many studies 
reported in the literature involving multiple year data collection, as is often the 
case in PhD studies.
2.9.3 Originality
The main original contribution was development of the 'Economic Stakeholder 
Analysis' (ESA) approach. This was developed as a practical, problem- 
focused and holistic framework for assessing local stakeholder incentives in 
PFM. The ESA framework is a useful contribution to 'livelihood economies' 
analysis, and has implications beyond the forestry sector. It comprises six 
main stages:
  ESA stage 1 characterises the stakeholders and their sub-groups, 
especially in terms of their needs and objectives, mainly using PRA 
methods;
  ESA stage 2 seeks a thorough understanding of the problem and decision- 
making context, also mainly using PRA methods;
  ESA stage 3 assesses the need for an economic study, and then identifies 
and physically quantifies the costs and benefits of PFM and alternative 
land use or livelihood options;
  ESA stage 4 investigates appropriate prices or values for the costs and 
benefits identified in ESA stage 3;
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  ESA stage 5 involves an economic comparison of alternative land uses, 
including an analysis of risk factors; and,
  ESA stage 6 involves returning the data to the community, and the 
participatory monitoring of PFM.
The book is structured around these six stages with the country case studies 
providing examples of the methods used and challenges faced. Other 
innovative aspects of the book and research study were:
  the attempt in the case studies to develop 'participatory economic analysis' 
with the aim of increasing ownership of the analysis, and encouraging 
stakeholders to use the calculations to help them make land use decisions 
(as discussed below, this was only partially successful);
  the emphasis on appropriate sequencing and complementarity in the use 
of memory recall methods;
  a 'head to head' comparison of PRA and a household survey in the 
Zimbabwe case study (published in Richards et al, 1999);
  highlighting rather than glossing over common mistakes or pitfalls in 
economic studies;
  the attempt in some of the case studies to estimate the discount rates and 
transaction costs of forest users;
  development of an interactive website which allows the reader to practice 
using some of the tools presented in the book: 
www.odifpeg.org.uk/economicsofPFM/examples.htm
  the book's attempt to make natural resource economics more accessible 
to non-economists.
2.9.4 Learning
While we found considerable methodological guidance on the economic 
analysis of forestry, most of this was inappropriate for assessing the 
incentives for local forest users. In most texts, there was an emphasis on 
sophisticated data collection and analysis methods, leading to a perception 
that economic analysis is complex and inaccessible, and PhD economists are 
needed. There was also a bias in the literature towards policy analysis and the
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use of environmental economics tools, with very few studies adopting a local 
forest user perspective. We therefore decided there was a need to make 
some basic economic tools accessible to national practitioners, many of whom 
are agricultural economists without a specialised training in natural resource 
economics. We also wanted to make natural resource economics accessible 
to a wider policy audience, although not with the idea of encouraging them to 
'dabble' with the methods (since a little knowledge can be dangerous when 
applying economic tools).
One of the lessons was that there are limits to local participation in the 
processing and analysis of economic data, especially when local forest users 
are less numerate and literate. There is considerable scope for participation in 
ESA stages 1,2,3 and 6, but the valuation (ESA 4) and economic 
comparison (ESA 5) stages are less amenable to participatory methods; e.g., 
calculations involving discount rates have to be done on the computer; some 
valuation issues cannot easily be solved in the field; and computer processing 
of data to compute gross margins and/or discounted measures of project 
worth are normally necessary. A key problem is the time that local people can 
invest in this process. They are almost always busy, and without incentives or 
compensation it is difficult to expect them to give more than a few hours on 
two or three different days. Higher levels of participation are possible with 
computer literate villagers, as has happened in some Mexican CFEs. 
Economic studies are therefore likely to involve a mix of more and less 
participatory methods.
It was also found that participatory approaches to valuing non-market benefits, 
like 'contingent ranking', were unreliable. There is no obvious alternative to 
using more sophisticated non-market valuation methods like contingent 
valuation, although the time and budget are rarely sufficient for these. It also 
proved difficult to elicit the personal discount rates of forest users. Given the 
methodological difficulties, it is more sensible to use opportunity cost based 
discount rates, and undertake sensitivity analysis on the discount rate to see 
how alternative livelihood options compare. But use of the 'barter-exchange' 
method to value subsistence products proved more successful (see 2.10.3).
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Another lesson was the relative reliability of different memory recall methods 
for different types of variables. For variables with little variation between 
households, like production inputs and transaction costs, PRA methods were 
reliable and cost-effective, at least from the researcher's perspective (PRA is 
time consuming from a community perspective). But when there is 
considerable inter-household variation as for production, income and NTFP 
labour data, PRA was unreliable and overestimated production and 
household income. But PRA work and key informant discussions can ensure a 
well designed household survey. The study therefore revealed a logical 
sequence in the use of memory call methods:
  PRA methods should be used first, especially in order to understand the 
forest and farming system, to define forest products and sources, and to 
explore risk, gender and temporal issues;
  In-depth key informant interviews for specialist products, and to generate 
enterprise or household gross margins;
  Household surveys, informed by PRA and key informant discussions, can 
be used for information needed on a household by household basis, or for 
variables likely to reflect high inter-household variability.
The country case studies revealed the following findings in terms of economic 
incentives for PFM (the Nepal case study is discussed in 2.10):
  the Bolivia case study assessed whether the management of small forest 
blocks by an organised group of colonist farmers was viable following 
favourable policy reforms. The main constraint to SFM was identified as 
low and fluctuating log prices due to weak regulation and abundant frontier 
timber, which also made illegal logging attractive to farmers. There were 
however some important non-market benefits: an approved forest 
management plan was an important step in obtaining land title, and thence 
higher land values. But the study found that once land title is obtained, 
SFM ceases to be an attractive land use option.
  the Ghana case study revealed how political economy factors and weak 
regulatory controls have dissuaded farmers from keeping timber trees on
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their cocoa farms, in spite of a naturally complementary relationship: some 
high value timber trees are excellent shade trees. These disincentives 
stemmed from policy failures in terms of the farmers' tree tenure and 
rights, and inadequate compensation for logging damage (2.3.5);
  the Mexican 'forest ejido' case study revealed concerns about the 
biological and economic sustainability of forest management at current 
extraction rates: female groups were more pessimistic than the men about 
future harvest levels of mahogany and NTFPs. This case study also 
focused on timber processing costs. A problem for some ejidos is that the 
viability of timber-based forest management and processing has been 
exaggerated by over-estimates of mahogany trees in forest inventories, 
and underestimation of depreciation of the sawmill and equipment.
  the Zimbabwean case study was notable for a 'head to head' comparison 
between PRA methods and household surveys. This revealed major 
differences in data reliability and cost-effectiveness of data collection 
between the two research methods; it particularly cast doubts over the 
reliability of PRA for quantitative estimates. It showed that NTFP collection, 
and processing of baskets and wine from palm cultivation generated 
modest poverty-alleviating cash flows in the dry season when there was 
little or no agricultural income, and that this was an important coping 
strategy in drought years (Richards et al., 1999).
2.9.5 Postscript
The book is currently being edited and published in Spanish (in Mexico) and 
Chinese (in China). In both cases, regional case studies have been added. 
There is also evidence of some tools being adopted in current studies of PFM. 
For example, a major study of the poverty impacts of PFM funded by the Ford 
Foundation and CARE has incorporated some of our tools in its research 
methodology, which is being applied in 40 villages in Nepal, Kenya and 
Tanzania (Dr Kate Schreckenberg, personal communication).
The author also participated in an analysis of PFM in Himachal Pradesh, India 
in 2005; this study involved a cost-benefit analysis comparison between Joint
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Forest Management (JFM) and control communities. It found that while JFM 
villages compared favourably with non-JFM villages in terms of the overall 
forest benefit flows, within the JFM communities they were skewed to 
wealthier villagers. As found in Nepal (see 2.10), livestock and land ownership 
were key to obtaining community forestry benefits.
2.10 Community forestry in Nepal (Publication 10)
Richards, M., Maharjan, M. & Kanel, K. (2003). Economics, Poverty 
and Transparency: Measuring Equity in Forest User Groups. 
Journal of Forest and Livelihood 3 (1): 91 -104
2.10.1 Context
This paper presents the Nepal case study from the DFID research study on 
the economics of PFM (9). It is based on two micro-economic research 
studies carried out in the Middle Hills area of Nepal in 1999 and 2000. 
Previous evaluations of Nepal's community forestry programme had revealed 
that although it was environmentally successful (improved forest cover and 
condition), there were concerns about the equity impacts. Therefore the study 
developed a participatory methodology so that Forest User Groups could, with 
some external assistance, assess the distribution of community forestry 
benefits. The hope was that improved transparency of equity or poverty 
impacts would form the basis for community consultations leading to more 
favourable management rules for poorer households.
2.10.2 Methods
The first fieldwork phase took place in early 1999, and focused on five Forest 
User Groups. The main elements of the methodology were: a wealth ranking 
exercise in each Forest User Group to identify wealth-ranked stakeholder 
groups; PRA exercises to clarify and map the types and flows of forest 
products, understand the role of forestry in the household economy, and 
generate labour and activity calendars; a key informant approach to 
estimating production levels, income and costs; a 'barter game' approach to
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identify unit values of subsistence forestry products; and discussion of the 
results in a plenary session with all the stakeholder groups.
In the second study, which took place in 2000 with a single Forest User 
Group, the main differences were that: (a) a household survey was used 
instead of key informants for calculating production and labour levels; (b) 
more attention and time was given to returning the data to the community in 
order to provide a basis for internal discussion (after the facilitators leave); 
and (c) more thought was given to identifying appropriate economic equity 
and gender indicators of community forestry. The calculations focused 
particularly on the economic return to labour from community forestry activities 
- mainly the collection of subsistence forest products like firewood, fodder and 
grass - enabling comparison with other livelihood options.
2.10.3 Originality
The main contribution of this paper was to show that a participatory approach 
to data collection and analysis can increase transparency of the equity 
impacts of community forestry. Correspondence with the second author 
(Appendix 3) revealed that the methodology has led to discussions in some 
Forest User Groups of the need for more equitable forest management rules. 
The study was important for some of the methodological issues, including 
limitations of participatory economic analysis, appropriate sequencing of 
memory recall methods and the tendency of over-estimation of forest 
production and income from group-based estimates.
It also showed the potential of an innovative participatory valuation method 
called the 'barter exchange' approach; there are very few published examples 
of this variant of a contingent valuation method. The barter exchange method 
involves a simulated village market situation in which community members 
barter a well-known household commodity (maize in this case) for forest 
products of uncertain market value. Its attraction is that unlike other contingent 
valuation methods it does not rely on a hypothetical or abstract market 
situation. In spite of this, the barter game resulted in some over-estimation of 
values (possible reasons for this are discussed in the paper). Finally, the
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paper was perhaps innovative in suggesting the use of 'economic equity' 
monitoring indicators for PFM, including gender-based indicators.
2.10.4 Learning
Apart from the methodological issues, the paper contributed to a better 
understanding of the equity impacts of community forestry. In the mid-hill 
areas of Nepal, forests are key to the welfare of the poor since they provide 
essential inputs to the farm and household economy like firewood, fodder and 
grass. Forest type or species is critical in determining the relative balance of 
market and subsistence benefits, and therefore the incentives for SFM. Pine 
forests are inferior to broadleaf forests for livestock inputs, but for poorer 
households with few or no cattle they were more valuable due to the cash 
opportunities from the sale of firewood, resin and poles.
While it might be expected that 'less poor' families with more on-farm tree 
resources were less dependent on community forestry, in practice they were 
more dependent than poorer families. This was because the latter relied more 
on off-farm income earning opportunities, and exerted less demand for 
livestock and manure inputs due to having less animals and land. Livestock 
ownership was the key to agricultural productivity via the use of manure and 
draft animals, as well as to better family nutrition. Landless or land-poor 
families were better off under the old 'open access' regime since they could 
obtain free grazing and firewood (albeit unsustainably). In addition it was the 
less poor who sat on the Forest User Group Committees, and who thus 
decided on forest management rules and choice of species. These often 
involved a trade-off between the subsistence benefits and longer term 
benefits associated with timber production. Better-off families can more easily 
afford to forgo PFM products due to their alternative sources of fodder, grass, 
grazing and firewood, and lower personal discount rates.
While not new, the paper confirmed that where forest product markets are 
weak or absent, the interdependence of forests, livestock and crops can result 
in strong incentives for SFM. In this situation, tenure security and strong CPR 
institutions are key drivers of SFM. But weak or absent markets limit the
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options for the resource poor. The study revealed that the main poverty 
alleviation options were: (a) to help poorer households obtain livestock and 
farmland; (b) modifications of Forest User Group rules to allow the poor to sell 
community forest products like firewood and poles; and (c) promotion of off- 
farm/forest employment options.
2.10.5 Postscript
A recent economic analysis of the benefits of community forestry in Nepal 
(Adhikari et al., 2004) reports almost identical conclusions. Based on an 
intensive and longitudinal research methodology, it found that wealthier 
households benefited more than poorer households as a result of their land 
and livestock holdings, as well as due to caste and education factors.
2.11 Illegal logging in Central America (Publication 11)
Richards, M., Wells, A., Del Gatto, F., Contreras-Hermosilla, A. and 
Pommier, D. (2003). Impacts of illegality and barriers to legality: a 
diagnostic analysis of illegal logging in Honduras and Nicaragua. 
International Forestry Review 5 (3): 282-291
2.11.1 Context
After the 'economics of PFM' study, my next main research study was on the 
causes and impacts of illegal logging in Central America, following successful 
proposals to DFID and the World Bank. This aimed to identify the causes, 
dynamics and consequences of illegal logging in Honduras and Nicaragua. I 
undertook this partly as an ODI Research Associate, having left ODI at the 
end of 2001.
2.11.2 Methods
The paper is based on primary data collection and analysis. The large 
research team carried out six case studies in illegal logging hotspots, three in 
each country. The main field research method was semi-structured interviews 
with key informants, including local people involved in illegal logging, loggers 
and local government officials. Interviews were also held with national forestry
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industry representatives, senior staff of the state forestry authorities, and 
forest sector consultants. We also analysed official national forest production 
and import/export data, as well as regional trade data (to the extent this 
existed), and held multi-stakeholder national workshops to discuss the 
findings and develop a consensus for remedial action.
2.11.3 Originality
This was one of the first empirical attempts to assess the impacts of illegal 
logging, as opposed to the many anecdotal and rather qualitative accounts. A 
systematic analysis of the economic, governance, social (poverty) and 
environmental impacts of illegal logging was undertaken. An innovative aspect 
of the study was the attempt to estimate the cost of illegal logging to each 
national economy, especially the loss of fiscal revenue and the opportunity 
cost of wasted expenditure on SFM. There was also an indicative estimate of 
the environmental costs of illegal logging. The aim of these calculations was 
to make the case for remedial action.
An important contribution of the paper was the classification of timber into 
three categories: 'legal', 'legalised' and 'clandestine' timber production. 
Previous studies had lumped the latter two categories together as illegal 
timber. 'Legalised production' refers to the fraudulent legalisation of timber 
production by corrupt officials so that it enters into official statistics as if it were 
legal, while 'clandestine production' is not documented and evades official 
fees and taxes. Both legalised and clandestine production involve bribery and 
corruption, since payments are made by illegal loggers either to obtain false 
documents or for officials to 'turn a blind eye'. Local experts in both countries 
estimated that most official production was 'legalised'.
Another innovative aspect of the paper was the analysis of transboundary 
timber movements. This revealed major inconsistencies between export and 
import data in the region, partly due to the significant illegal cross-border 
trade. It was concluded that both countries were substantially under-declaring 
their timber exports.




This study reinforced my understanding of the role of forest governance and 
the regulatory framework. Failure to control illegal logging combined with over- 
regulation had created an unlevel market playing field and raised the 
opportunity costs of (legal) SFM. The weak regulatory and governance 
environments caused various disincentives for SFM. An excess timber supply 
situation depressed market prices, and legal operators suffered from high 
transaction costs, both due to the excessive regulations resulting in numerous 
fiscal charges, and from having to pay corrupt state officials 'informal 
payments' even when all the papers were in order. Meanwhile illegal loggers 
benefited from low penalties and weak enforcement. These and other factors 
were 'barriers to legality' and encouraged forest crime.
CFEs were found to be especially vulnerable to the effects of weak and 
corrupt forestry authorities; e.g., in Honduras, one case study revealed that 
loggers had bought their way into CFEs in order to obtain cutting permits. This 
infiltration caused community divisions, rival factions between 'bought' and 
law-abiding citizens, and an increase in violence. Two Honduran CFEs lost 
their certification status as a result of the illegalities perpetrated mainly by 
outsiders. In addition, the case studies showed that illegal logging had 
negative impacts on sustainable livelihoods due to the erosion of social and 
natural capital. Any employment by loggers was poorly remunerated, and 
gains in financial capital were thin and temporary. Another example of how 
institutional weaknesses impinged on SFM objectives was that the national 
forestry authorities were financially dependent on forest revenue, especially in 
Nicaragua. This resulted in the issue of felling permits beyond the allowable 
cut. In Nicaragua, there was evidence of agreements between the Forest 
Service, local governments and community leaders to 'legalise' over- 
production.
Key remedies to these problems include administrative and legal 
rationalisation and simplification, heavier fines and better enforcement,
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increased transparency and accountability (including through the involvement 
of NGOs, community groups and local government in monitoring logging 
activities), increased rights and tenure security for CFEs, depoliticising the 
election of senior forestry officials, reduced dependence of state forestry 
agencies on forest revenue and the development of PES mechanisms.
It was also found that better control of illegal logging in one country is unlikely 
to reduce overall illegal timber flows if there is no change in forest governance 
in neighbouring countries. The problem is 'displacement' or 'leakage': when 
illegal logging comes under control in one country, the demand for cheap 
timber remains and sucks in illegal imports from elsewhere. For example, 
Costa Rica claimed to have a much lower level of illegal logging than its 
neighbours, but imported large quantities of clandestine timber from 
Nicaragua, most of it across the San Juan river which borders the two 
countries (the author crossed this thinly patrolled border in 1997).
My conclusion of the study in terms of incentives for SFM is that forest 
governance (or the lack of it) is the most important determinant of SFM, since 
regulatory failures and corruption result in high costs of legal production and 
depress market prices. We therefore found that the "legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework creates strong incentives to break or avoid the law" 
(290). Improved forest law enforcement will only emerge through concerted 
political mobilisation and action by a range of stakeholders, both internal and 
external. The biggest hurdle is the political will to control illegal logging and 
other forms of forest crime.
2.11.5 Postscript
For the Honduras based co-author, this study was key in making illegal 
logging a major political issue (Filippo Del Gatto, personal communication). 
The estimates of illegal timber flows and costs to the economy have been 
regularly cited in the national press as well as in regional scientific 
publications. The study led to an ongoing (2005-07) project to increase 
transparency in Honduras' forest sector involving Global Witness and the 
National Commission of Human Rights. Another important influence has been
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the Environmental Movement of Olancho, a popular activism movement 
against illegal logging and corruption involving Catholic priests, communities 
and local governments. These pressures led to a commitment at the end of 
2005 by the new President of Honduras to commit 1 per cent of national 
income to forest protection and reforestation. At the regional level, the Central 
American Commission for Environment and Development (CCAD) has 
commissioned a study of regional timber trade flows to be carried out by the 
Tropical Agricultural Research and Teaching Centre (CATIE). This will feed 
into the Central American Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (FLEG) 
meeting proposed for 2007.
The study has also been incorporated into two CIFOR books (Colchester et 
al., 2006, and Tacconi, 2007). This book makes the important point that 
before being enforced, forest and extra-sectoral legislation needs to be 
equitable. For example, it should recognise customary tenure and access 
rights. Inequitable legislation and biased administrative and judiciary systems 
reinforce social and legal biases against forest communities, and cause 
negative livelihood impacts. This is a warning against 'fast track' approaches 
to forest law enforcement. I was able to contribute my learning from the 
Central American study at a 2004 FAO/ITTO workshop on best practices in 
forest governance and law enforcement (FAO/ITTO, 2005).
2.12 Forest trade and governance (Publication 12)
Richards, M. (2004). Forest trade policies - how do they affect 
forest governance? Unasylva 219: 39-43
2.12.1 Context
In 2002 I was commissioned by IIED to review the impacts of international 
forest trade policies on forest governance. This was part of a larger study for 
the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on the effects of 
international trade on SFM. For this study, I drew particularly on my work on 
illegal logging in Central America (Publication 11), on innovative incentives for 
SFM (8) and on my earlier work for IIED in Ghana (3). The short paper for the
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FAO forestry journal Unasylva was drawn from a longer paper 'Higher 
international standards or race to the bottom? The impacts of forest product 
trade liberalisation on forest governance1 . I presented this at an FAO 'Expert 
Consultation on Trade and Sustainable Forest Management - Impacts and 
Interactions' in Rome, 3-5 February 2003: 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/foris/data/trade/pdf/richard.pdf
2.12.2 Methods
This research study, which took place over about a year, involved an 
extensive review of the forest trade and governance literature, and a mix of 
primary and secondary data collection and analysis from case studies in 
Brazil, Indonesia and Mexico. The Brazil and Indonesia studies were carried 
out by experienced consultants working under my supervision, while I 
undertook the Mexican study. The primary data derived mainly from 
discussions with key informants and stakeholders involved in logging and 
forest governance, including community and industrial forestry 
representatives, senior government officials, international and local NGOs, 
and academics (e.g., Dr David Bray, University of Florida).
2.12.3 Original contribution
This was an original piece of research in that, while various studies have 
touched on these issues (e.g., effects of trade policies on SFM), none had 
specifically examined the relationship between international trade policies and 
forest governance. A key contribution of the paper was to trace through the 
effects of forest trade policies on the incentives of different stakeholders 
(especially forest managers or companies, forestry department staff, senior 
civil servants and politicians) to either pursue rent-seeking options or to 
operate legally.
The paper examined the relationship between trade policies and forest 
governance both in theory and practice, and brought together a wide range of 
literature. This included literature on neo-classical economic theory which 
tends to favour positive governance impacts from trade liberalisation, on 
international trade and environmental governance interactions, and on the
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drivers of corruption. The case studies allowed an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between trade policies and forest governance in three very 
different contexts in terms of the trade policies, forest governance, and the 
political and macro-economic context.
2.12.4 Learning
The main finding was that trade policies have weak, indirect and often 
unintended impacts on forest governance. This is because they interact with 
other policies and pressures that have a more direct influence on forest 
governance. Forest governance was found to be more dependent on 
macroeconomic and political factors like economic development, political 
stability and democratic progress. Indonesia, with rampant corruption and 
illegal logging, was locked into a downward development and governance 
spiral, exacerbated by economic and political instability. Brazil and Mexico, on 
the other hand, were on an upwards economic and political (e.g., increased 
space for civil society) trajectory, and were making better forest governance 
progress, at least in their export sectors.
Economic development seems to reduce the 'resource curse' governance 
problems of countries that are well-endowed with forests and other natural 
resources, and which rely on mining these resources for their economic 
development. The 'curse' is that this natural wealth is often associated with 
strong vested interests and poor macroeconomic management. There is also 
an apparent 'environmental Kuznets curve' for forestry10 , although the 
evidence is clearer in Latin America than in Asia and Africa, mainly because 
most developing countries have not reached the threshold income level at 
which deforestation is expected to fall (Kaimowitz and Angelsen, 2001).
Whether higher producer prices due to trade liberalisation encourage better 
governance depends primarily on the effectiveness of the governance and 
regulatory framework. Without effective regulation, higher prices encourage
10 According to the environmental Kuznets curve, the environment firstly worsens with 
rising income or economic development, but then improves after a threshold level of 
income or development is reached.
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unsustainable logging, which depresses domestic prices and discourages 
SFM. Freer trade can also encourage lower cost production through non- 
compliance in order to remain competitive. However, where the regulatory 
framework is stronger, freer trade should encourage SFM.
It was also found that incentives stemming from trade policies magnify or 
reinforce existing forest governance trends. Thus where forest governance is 
weak, either trade liberalisation or protection tends to exacerbate the 
problems. For example, a deregulatory forest law in Mexico prior to NAFTA in 
1994 caused a big increase in illegal logging. In Brazil, improving forest 
governance standards in the export sector have received a boost from trade 
liberalisation and certification. But this may have been at the expense of 
governance standards in the much larger domestic sector, which is less 
subject to international scrutiny, but more prone to forest governance 
problems (a common finding of the three case studies). The paper also notes 
that agricultural trade liberalisation has had a bigger impact on forest 
governance; e.g., freer trade for soybean has caused massive illegal forest 
clearance in the Amazon. State incentives for oil palm plantations in Indonesia 
have had the same effect.
It was easier to substantiate negative governance effects from trade 
restrictions than to show positive governance effects from trade liberalisation. 
Log and lumber export bans protect domestic forest industry by depressing 
domestic log prices, and this results in industrial over-capacity, which in turn 
increases illegal logging pressures since the legal cut is insufficient to satisfy 
demand. Indonesia is the classic historical example of this (Gillis and Repetto, 
1988). Depending on the mix of political and economic factors, trade 
liberalisation reduces rent-seeking incentives for some stakeholders, but 
increases them for others.
Another finding was the way that trade facilitates the cross-border transfer of 
governance problems (as found in Publication 11). When a country improves 
its forest governance (e.g., Malaysia) or introduces a logging ban (e.g., 
China), this increases demand pressures and illegal logging in weaker
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governance neighbours (e.g., Indonesia). This shows the importance of a 
regional forest governance approach, as in the FLEG process. Another lesson 
was the sequencing of freer trade and governance improvements: as noted by 
Stiglitz (1998), governance quality is key to trade liberalisation outcomes. 
Therefore institutions and regulatory frameworks need to be strengthened 
before rather than after trade liberalisation. But with the structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1990s, the tendency has been the opposite.
2.12.5 Postscript
As already mentioned, trade measures can have unexpected governance 
impacts. Recent years have seen consumer countries, particularly in Europe, 
raising import standards of tropical timber. This has been partly due to activist 
NGOs like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, which have raised the 
stakes by exposing high profile users of illegal timber (e.g., UK government 
and the John Lewis Company). The European Forest Law Enforcement, 
Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative and the timber procurement policies 
of several European countries are well-intentioned attempts to reduce the 
demand for illegal timber. While no one would argue against raising timber 
import standards, the net effect of these measures on tropical SFM is unclear. 
A consequence of higher import standards is higher compliance and 
verification costs for forest managers. Unless these costs are compensated by 
higher 'forest-gate1 prices, they may encourage producers to switch to lower 
value but less discriminating import markets like China's. According to a 
recent market report:
"West African log prices remained firm buoyed by demand from Asia. 
In contrast, prices fell for the European market underscoring the 
diminishing importance of this market for African exporters. Chinese 
demand for African sawnwood has given domestic processing policies 
a significant boost" (1TTO Tropical Timbers Market Report, 11-15 
September 2006).
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2.13 Forest certification and governance (Publication 13)
Richards, M. (2004). Certification in Complex Socio-Political 
Settings. Looking Forward to the Next Decade. Forest Trends: 
Washington, DC. http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/ 
publications/ComplexSettings.pdf
2.13.1 Context
Following the illegal logging study and the review of trade policies and forest 
governance, I was commissioned by Forest Trends (a forest policy 'think tank' 
research group based in Washington) to undertake a review of forest 
certification in 'complex socio-political settings'. This study brought together 
the forest governance and trade issues explored in publications 11 and 12 
with an important demand-side incentive for SFM -forest management 
certification. Before it appeared on the Forest Trends website, the paper was 
peer reviewed and presented at two international conferences:
  'International Congress on Globalisation, Localisation and Tropical Forest 
Management in the 21st Century' 22-23 October 2003 in Amsterdam. 
http://www.forest-trends.org/documents/meetings/Amsterdam_2003/ 
CertificationAmsterdam.ppt
  'Forest Certification in Developing and Transitioning Societies: Social, 
Ecological and Economic Effects', 10-11 June 2004 at the Yale School of 
Forestry and Environmental Studies. 
http://www.yale.edu/forestcertification/symposium/
2.13.2 Methods
This paper is based on an extensive published and grey literature review, 
supplemented by seven commissioned 'mini' case studies by experienced 
observers of the progress and challenges of certification in Brazil, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Bolivia, Central Africa and Russia.




The paper explores the links between certification and governance issues, 
given that 'complex socio-political settings' tend to equate with weak 
governance situations. Although not original, it was perhaps controversial in 
questioning donor and NGO policies to fast track certification as a demand- 
side incentive for SFM. It warns that when certification is donor-led and 
implemented in isolated forest management units (FMUs), this is unlikely to 
promote SFM in a country. As some of the case studies reveal, when the legal 
and regulatory framework is ineffective (for example, due to over-complex 
regulations which encourage forest crime) and inequitable, FMU certification 
can have negative equity impacts, and may slow down the overall process of 
moving towards SFM and conservation. This is because it can give credibility 
to governments that are not tackling the policy and institutional failures driving 
forest degradation. For example, where indigenous property rights are weakly 
recognised, certification appears to sanction the rights of industrial forestry 
concessions over customary tenure areas, as has happened in Indonesia and 
Malaysia. I am more supportive of certification when it is a national rather than 
FMU level process, and involves the establishment of national and 
participatory policy fora, and the setting of national FSC standards.
I also adopt what might be viewed as an anti-market position in advocating a 
new approach to certification of CFEs, alerting donors and NGOs to the risks 
and vulnerability of export-oriented forest management systems (Publication 
6). Only rarely has international market access been consistently achieved by 
CFEs, and in general the costs of certification have outweighed the benefits 
and led to disillusionment. I argue that if CFEs can demonstrate a long-term 
social and livelihood interest in the forest, they should not be treated 
identically to industrial forestry enterprises. The paper therefore proposes a 
'non-market based certification' process in which communities can obtain non- 
market benefits of certification, like tenure and institutional security, as well as 
PES in the longer term. (Scherr et al. (2004a) also advocate local certification 
standards based on indigenous management values and practices).




Forest management certification has made rapid progress in temperate 
countries but slow progress in the tropics. There are various reasons for this, 
the most important of which is the economic disincentive caused by the 
'standards gap'. This is the gap between current forest management 
standards, as determined by existing laws, policies and their implementation, 
and the 'gold standard' of the FSC. This gap makes the cost of meeting the 
FSC standard prohibitive. The cost includes the opportunity cost of shifting to 
SFM (in this context the opportunity cost is the difference between a high but 
unsustainable yield and a lower SFM yield). In a stronger regulatory 
framework, the 'standards gap' diminishes, as has happened in Bolivia, and 
certification becomes to some extent market-led (Box 1). By contrast, where 
forest governance is weak and the standards gap is large, certification has 
been donor-led.
Certification therefore needs to be integrated into a broader forest governance 
agenda involving the following sequence: firstly, establishment of an equitable 
and effective legal and regulatory framework (including extra-sectoral 
legislation); secondly, compliance with forest regulations; and thirdly, 
certification. Once again, a balanced supply and demand-side approach is 
needed. The most positive effects of certification, most apparent in Brazil and 
Bolivia, have been through the development of participatory forest policy fora 
needed for setting national FSC standards. The paper also compares 
certification progress in Latin America with Asia and Africa. In terms of the 
area of tropical forest certified under the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) in 
2006, twelve of the top 20 countries were in South America. The paper 
suggests that a stronger civil society sector in South America has had a 
significant influence in bringing about a more enabling policy and institutional 
environment for certification.
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Box 1. Regulatory incentives for certification and SFM in Bolivia
In the early 1990s I observed on several visits that Bolivia's forestry sector suffered 
from a typical set of problems, including illegal logging, patronage in forest 
concession allocation, and weak tenure and marketing rights for indigenous 
communities. But such has been the change that Bolivia has become world leader in 
terms of the tropical forest area certified by the FSC (over 2 million hectares at 
October 2006). This is the result of a set of policy, legal and institutional reforms 
which have encouraged SFM, including a new and depoliticised state forest authority, 
secure tenure and full timber marketing rights for indigenous communities, area- 
based forest fees which discourage waste, and a competitive concession allocation 
system. Therefore switching to SFM and achieving the FSC standards has a 
relatively low opportunity cost.
It is noticeable however that only one of 16 certified forests in Bolivia is currently 
under (indigenous) community management. Even with better governance and 
control there are still major constraints to SFM and certification for communities, 
including administrative capacity, market risk and diseconomies of scale. Complying 
with certification regulations typically costs a community US $20,000 in the first year 
and $8,000 per annum thereafter. This can be difficult without donor or government 
support. Small-scale illegal logging, e.g., individual chainsaw operators, to supply the 
domestic market is also still prevalent.
Additional sources to Publication 13: Colchester et a/., 2006, 
http://www. fee. org/en/whats_new/news/news/54
Finally, the paper comments on the underplayed link between certification and 
PES. The original assumption of certification was that consumers would pay a 
'green premium' in recognition of the ecological benefits of SFM. So far they 
have been unwilling to do this, so that donors and governments have had to 
subsidise certification. While subsidies for SFM are justifiable (Publication 8), 
they can be problematic, e.g., the difficulty of removing them. Since 
certification effectively shows that a forest is supplying a bundle of ecological 
services, the logical aim of certification should be to support market-based 
PES, both at a forest and landscape level.




Subsequent to this paper, the author conducted an unpublished study for 
Timbmet Limited, UK's largest importer of tropical timber, on the costs and 
benefits of certification for tropical forest managers (Richards, 2004). Based 
on secondary data, it found that, at least for Southeast Asia, a 10-25 per cent 
increase in 'forest gate' prices is needed to compensate the net additional 
costs of certification. This indicates the premium needed for certification to 
become demand rather than donor led. As noted in 2.12.5, there has been a 
sharp rise in demand for certified timber in recent years. This has resulted in a 
small 'risk premium' for certified timber, but it is still insufficient for demand-led 
certification, and donors continue to be prime movers in promoting 
certification, even for industrial forestry concessions. For example, it was 
recently announced that FSC has certified 570,000 hectares managed by the 
WWF supported Barana Company in Guyana, the largest tropical forest area 
to be certified by FSC (CFA Newsletter, 2006).
The extension of certification to PES now appears to be on the agenda. The 
author was recently invited by Forest Trends to take part in a major research 
study in 2007 to assess how to extend forest management certification to 
bundled PES.




3.1 Critique of market commodity-based approaches to SFM
The most prominent theme of my publications is that market commodity based 
approaches in the tropics tend to make both the resource and the forest- 
dependent poor vulnerable. This vulnerability can occur whether the forest 
resource has either a higher or lower market value. The main reasons for this 
are:
  Forest management in the tropics takes place in a weak policy and
regulatory environment in which it is more profitable to over-harvest and/or 
clear forests for other land uses. Unregulated or illegal logging depresses 
prices 11 and results in an unlevel playing field for law-abiding forest 
managers who have higher costs than illegal loggers, and alternative land 
uses seem more attractive. In other words the opportunity costs become 
too high for SFM. When forest product values are higher due to market 
proximity or trade liberalisation, the resource becomes vulnerable to rent 
seeking by external stakeholders; and when they are low there is an 
incentive to stay competitive by reducing costs through non-compliance 
(Publications 3, 4, 8, 11, 12).
  As pointed out by Stiglitz (1998), markets need regulating and governance 
quality is key to the social and environmental outcomes of market based 
development policies. But political economy realities generally discourage 
improvements in forest governance; political, business and sometimes 
military elites have vested interests in weak governance and inequitable 
law enforcement since this allows them to excercise their rent-seeking 
powers. The evidence also suggests that governance quality is correlated 
with economic development, political stability and democratic progress. 
Poorer countries like Indonesia with abundant natural resources often 
suffer from 'resource curse 1 governance problems, while middle income 
countries (e.g., Brazil and Mexico) tend to have a stronger civil society 
which demands greater accountability, transparency and social justice;
11 One source (Seneca Creek, 2004) estimates that illegal production depresses 
world prices of forest products by 6 to 17 per cent depending on the type of product.
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these countries are therefore making better forest governance progress, at 
least in their export sectors (3, 12, 13).
  The viability of SFM depends on a market place that values multiple 
purpose forestry, including ecological services, a wider range of NTFPs 
and lesser known timber species. The obvious advantages of PES are that 
there is no risk of over-exploitation, they are voluntary and do not involve 
so much external funding since they 'internalise the externalities'. But 
without effective global governance of public goods like forest carbon and 
biodiversity, there is little willingness to pay for them, except in emerging 
voluntary carbon and biodiversity offset markets (8, 13).
  Forest product market-based approaches may be less appropriate for 
indigenous societies since they can cause a clash of incentives. At least 
among Amerindian groups, this weakens indigenous institutions which 
prevent free-riding in common property regimes (6, 9).
  A primarily forest sector approach will have limited success while the main 
drivers of forest decline are 'extra-sectoral', e.g., insecure tenure, roads or 
development projects near forest areas, subsidised agriculture, 
inappropriate tenure legislation, etc. (4, 7, 8, 11).
3.2 Market values, forest governance and appropriate policies
"Effective action to protect existing forests ... requires changes to the 
structure of economic incentives that lead to unsustainable logging and 
to the conversion offorestland to agriculture" (Stern, 2006: 540)
Building on 3.1, Figure 1 is a simplistic attempt to show some of the policy 
implications of the interaction between market values and forest governance 
(or the regulatory framework). The y axis includes both forest and farm 
product values, since they tend to be correlated according to market access 
and distance, although a high value timber species or NTFP can occasionally 
cause remote but accessible forests to have a high 'stumpage value'.
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Figure 1. Interaction of market values and forest governance in 
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Where market values are high and governance or control is weak (upper left 
quadrant), forests are vulnerable to rent seeking, illegal logging and over- 
exploitation. The forest sector priorities are obviously to strengthen control 
and governance, as well as appropriate forest pricing to dampen timber 
demand from state forests. Strengthening the property rights of resident 
stakeholders, especially indigenous groups, is critical, as are efforts to 
dampen extra-sectoral pressures on forests and support civil society so that it 
demands greater accountability and transparency from a powerful forest 
industry. In this situation, trade-based or demand-side incentives for SFM tend 
to cause unintended or perverse incentives, especially for local stakeholders. 
There is more potential from targeting niche agroforestry market opportunities 
for products like certified cocoa or coffee, especially in forest-farm
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'mosaiclands1 (Chomitz et al., 2006). There may also be win-win opportunities 
in forest transition areas, where rising timber prices are stimulating secondary 
forest regrowth on abandoned agricultural land (Rudel et al., 2005).
When both governance and forest values are low (lower left quadrant), the 
main threat is conversion to other land uses. The main priorities are again to 
raise forest governance levels, secure property rights, and dampen or 
counteract extra-sectoral policies which are less critical to the broader 
development process. A new road for example, while it will increase the 
stumpage value of forests, will provide a bigger stimulus to agriculture, 
facilitate the arrival of colonists and ranchers, subsidise unregulated logging 
and cause land speculation. Off-farm employment, higher off-farm wages and 
rural education may also help reduce the agricultural pressures (Southgate, 
1998). At the same time care is needed that such measures do not also 
increase demand-pull to the frontier (7).
Since governments are increasingly willing to devolve lower value forests to 
communities (Molnar et al., 2004), and indigenous groups tend to inhabit more 
remote forests, there are important policy implications for PFM in this 
quadrant. Ratification and defence of property rights, PES and/or social and 
political support to indigenous societies in support of traditional natural 
resource management regimes can achieve win-win outcomes, although intra- 
community equity can be problematic (6, 10). Protected areas have a role but 
may be less cost-effective for conservation (only) outcomes.
Where market values are higher and forest governance is improving (upper 
right quadrant), the emphasis can shift towards demand-side incentives for 
SFM. But market proximity or access also encourages other land uses. It 
therefore remains important to dampen or counter extra-sectoral policies that 
increase the opportunity costs of SFM. (But it can be very difficult to modify 
these due to the perceived or real development benefits, not to mention 
political economy constraints). Conservation is an expensive option when 
alternative land uses are profitable, but PES would have high potential in a 
better governance framework. There is however an important caveat about
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'displacement1 of deforestation to weakly regulated countries through 
international trade when a country reduces its timber production by better 
control and governance. As already mentioned, niche market opportunities for 
agroforestry systems and sustainable livelihood opportunities in forest 
transition areas should also be promoted.
Where market values are low due to accessibility and distance factors, and 
governance and control are improving (lower right quadrant), conservation 
rather than market-based SFM has a better chance of success. PES or the 
'contract exchange' approach - commitments to environmental stewardship in 
exchange for social and political support - with indigenous groups have a high 
potential. However this situation is rare since governance tends to be minimal 
in remote areas, and an 'uncivil society1 often fills the governance vacuum (4, 
11).
3.3 Carrots and sticks: a question of balance
3.3.1 The 'supply side': governance and law enforcement
Many of my publications show that getting the 'supply side' right is essential 
for SFM, and is a precondition for the effectiveness of demand-side incentives 
like PES, trade liberalisation and certification. But in retrospect I realise there 
is an apparent dichotomy or contradiction in my publications. On the one hand 
most of them argue that a stronger regulatory and governance framework is 
the main way forward, but on the other hand many highlight the political 
economy constraints to effective policy and institutional reform (3, 4, 11, 12). I 
also observe that excessive regulations impose heavy burdens on forest 
managers, encourage evasion and corruption, and are expensive to enforce 
(11, 12). History therefore shows that 'control and command 1 strategies tend 
to be ineffective and inefficient.
My observations, further reading (e.g., Chomitz et al., 2006; Colchester et al., 
2006) and involvement in an FAO/ITTO 'expert workshop1 to promote best
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practice in legal compliance12 , lead me to a more nuanced view of the 'supply 
side 1 agenda. This includes an increasing realisation that 'carrots' can play a 
key role in encouraging or facilitating the 'sticks', as well as visa versa. I 
therefore suggest the following areas are key to improving the 'supply side': 
i. simplification and rationalisation of laws and regulations; 
ii. use of market-based incentives for legal compliance when there is an
adequate governance platform for them to work; 
iii. building national consensus for legal and policy reforms, including
through public education campaigns based on the costs of forest crime; 
iv. increased transparency of the forest industry and state forestry authority; 
v. support for NGOs and civil society in their efforts to increase downward 
accountability and promote equity in legal and judicial systems.
The need to simplify and rationalise over-complex and sometimes 
contradictory legal and regulatory systems (i) was a key conclusion of the 
Central America illegal logging study (11) and is emphasised in the FAO/ITTO 
good practice guidelines (FAO/ITTO, 2005). As regards (ii), the best incentive 
for compliance would be PES, but there is also scope for positive regulatory 
incentives. For example, Bolivia's forest legislation exempts certified forestry 
enterprises from state audits, saving both parties significant transaction costs 
(13). Certification, which obliges legal compliance, also provides access to 
higher value wood product markets like Europe, although communities have 
struggled to participate in these.
Recent examples show the potential of market-based approaches for legal 
compliance (Chomitz et al., 2006):
  Brazil's Transferable Forest Protection Obligations' cap and trade system 
which provides landowners with a strong incentive to maintain more than 
the legal minimum of their landholding as forest (see 2.7.5);
  Concession auctions, area-based fees (which reduce waste) and 
'performance bonds' in Cameroon. Increased competitiveness for 
concessions helps compliance, as does the performance bond in which a
12 To which I contributed a case study on forest governance and law enforcement in
Economic Incentives for the Sustainable Management and Conservation of Tropical Forests
Michael Richards
73
lump-sum deposit by a concessionaire is returned to him/her gradually 
over several cutting cycles on the basis of independent monitoring (8).
But these market-based approaches still require forest governance and 
administrative capacity for their effective implementation, as well as 
independent verification of compliance. A recent review of PES (Scherr et al., 
2006) also points out that a stronger and more equitable legal and institutional 
framework is essential for pro-poor PES, again showing that a 'supply' and 
'demand 1 balance is indispensable.
The Central American illegal logging study (11) adopted the approach 
suggested in (iii), and to some extent (iv) and (v). Using estimates of the 
economic, social and environmental costs of illegal logging, we worked to 
build a consensus for reform through national multiple stakeholder workshops, 
popular posters and media coverage. In a follow-up programme, Global 
Witness is working closely with civil society groups to increase transparency 
and raise public awareness, and aims to introduce 'Independent Forest 
Monitoring 1 as in Cameroon and Cambodia (Global Witness, 2005). More 
equitable legislation and judiciary systems (v) are also key to the equity 
impacts of PES markets. This requires innovative measures to increase 
administrative and judicial transparency and accountability, multi-stakeholder 
platforms for conflict management, etc.
My later publications provide a warning about unilateral approaches to forest 
governance, and show the importance of regional approaches as in the FLEG 
initiatives. This is due to the problem of displacement already discussed. Thus 
China's imports from the rest of Asia, as well as Africa, have increased 
enormously following its logging ban. This raises a possible concern about the 
SFM impacts of higher European import standards: higher compliance and 
verification costs in Africa without a commensurate increase in producer 
prices may be causing suppliers to switch to the less demanding China 
market. Ironically, much of the timber ends up in Europe as re-exports
Indonesia to this study (FAO/ITTTO, 2005).
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(2.12.5). The challenge is how to simultaneously raise import standards in 
China as well as in other large markets like North America and Japan.
3.3.2 The 'demand 1 side: PES and other incentives
Another common finding of my publications is that without PES, SFM and 
conservation are unlikely to be viable. Global and national governance and 
regulations are essential for generating willingness to pay for public goods (8). 
Thus Molnar et al. (2004) call for a global forest convention and other 
mechanisms to recognise and support community conservation, while 
Southgate (1998) argues that the UN Convention of Biological Diversity 
should levy charges on transnational activities using the 'global commons'.
Carbon is the one forest-related public good for which global governance has 
created a market for ecological services, but natural tropical forests are 
excluded from the CDM, as well as from the European (emissions) Trading 
Scheme. But with the support of high profile advocates like Stern (2006) and 
Stiglitz (2006), there is increasing momentum to include 'avoided 
deforestation' (AD) in the second accounting period (from 2013) of the Kyoto 
Protocol, and possibly before. According to the Stern Report, AD offers a 
relatively cheap and quick way of cutting up to a fifth of global carbon 
emissions. Since AD is a logical culmination of my repeated emphasis on 
PES, as well as the supply-side 'pre-conditions', and in view of the unique 
political opportunity for forests provided by the climate change agenda, I feel 
justified in devoting some space to it.
A common aspect of the various AD proposals (see 2.8.5) is that reduced 
deforestation is only possible through national programmes due to the 
'leakage' or displacement problem, and in order to reduce national 
deforestation rates, the policy and institutional failures would have to be 
tackled. But there are various challenges requiring considerable international 
political will and resources for AD to be operationalised on a sufficient scale to 
have a major impact. The first challenge is whether to include it in the CDM of 
the Kyoto Protocol. This is mainly due to concerns about market flooding and 
the carbon price, environmental integrity and reduced pressures to cut
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industrial emissions, risks and impermanence. But, as argued by Chomitz et 
al. (2006) and others, AD would enable more ambitious emission caps, lower 
global mitigation costs, 'buy time1 for technology and policies to effect cuts in 
industrial emissions, and increase developing country participation in Kyoto, 
thereby facilitating US participation. A way may also need to be found to 
compensate the 'losers' among tropical forest countries. The winners will be 
those with high deforestation rates and the losers those with low deforestation 
rates: a key issue is whether and how much to reward past conservation 
efforts. For Ebeling (2006) this may require introducing some 'hot air' into the 
system, as happened when Russia was persuaded to ratify Kyoto.
Assuming the political hurdles can be overcome, AD would also require 
considerable up-front funding since carbon payments will mainly occur ex- 
post13 . Significant investments will be needed both for developing the required 
national carbon infrastructure, including specialised institutions and 
technology, and the policy and regulatory reform process. Judging by the 
experiences of Bolivia and Cameroon, two relative success stories, the latter 
will require strong donor support. Therefore the international community will 
need to take the lead in pre-financing AD and/or underwriting risks to forward 
investors in AD credits. But even with the climate change agenda, and the 
obvious premium on good governance in AD (Ebeling, 2006), it is uncertain 
whether industrialised countries will make the commitments required. In this 
case, probably only mid-income Latin American countries, China, India, South 
Africa and some Asian 'tiger1 economies would be able to rapidly develop a 
national AD programme.
Another challenge will be how to translate national level carbon payments into 
local level incentives that compensate land use opportunity costs. There are 
also various equity concerns, including that vested interests might expropriate 
property rights that are not fully formalised (e.g., under customary land tenure)
13 'Ex-ante financing 1 by buyers of AD credits is a possibility, but would involve heavily 
discounted prices (due to the risks) or very expensive insurance. A possible semi- 
commercial approach might be low interest loans to be repaid from carbon payments. 
However this runs a risk if governments think there is a chance of debt forgiveness.
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or in some way attenuate the rights of resident stakeholders to exclude 
carbon. As proposed by Swallow et al. (2005), there is an urgent need for 
collective action and second-tier PES institutions for indigenous and other 
local communities, not least to lower transaction costs.
PES markets can also be voluntary, as in the case of voluntary carbon and 
biodiversity offset markets responding to increased pressures for corporate 
social responsibility and individual concerns to neutralise carbon footprints. 
Voluntary markets have the advantage of flexibility, so that valuable 
experience is being gained in how to combine carbon and biodiversity 
('biocarbon') and/or social benefits in the Chicago Climate Exchange and 
other markets (Bayon et al., 2006).
Apart from carbon forestry, the most promising and fastest growing PES 
markets are payments for watershed protection, biodiversity offsets and 'eco- 
certified 1 products (Scherr et al., 2006, Bishop et al., 2006). Demand for clean 
water could double or triple by 2050, while watershed erosion and agro- 
chemical use are increasing its scarcity. Watershed PES can be for water 
quality (including reduced nutrient loading), flood control and dry season water 
flow, although the role of forests in these services is site-specific and often 
lacks a strong scientific basis. Public or state-mediated schemes are currently 
much more important than private or market-based schemes. Watershed PES 
schemes have grown rapidly in Latin America, but are less common in Africa 
and Asia, except in China where there is a major programme (Scherr et al, 
2006).
Markets for biodiversity offsets are also growing fast, although they are 
currently on a much smaller scale. There is most scaling-up promise from 
regulatory-based biodiversity offsets like Brazil's system based on land use 
legislation (Section 2.7.5). There are also increasing examples of voluntary 
biodiversity offsets, in which mining, power and other development projects 
commit to offset their biodiversity and livelihood impacts in order to obtain 
'license to operate1 (Bishop et al, 2006). On the other hand 'bioprospecting', in 
which pharmaceutical companies make 'stewardship' payments to local
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stakeholders in exchange for commercial germplasm development rights, has 
been relatively disappointing (Bishop et al, 2006).
As regards the more established markets for forest products and services, 
eco-tourism is often singled out as being of the greatest promise, partly since 
it rewards conservation rather than exploitation. But eco-tourism has had 
moderate success, with most benefits going to urban-based tourism 
companies (GEF, 2006), although there are some notable exceptions. These 
include the model participatory approaches of the Communal Areas 
Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) approach in 
Zimbabwe, now replicated in a modified form in Zambia and Namibia, and the 
Rainforest Expeditions Project in the Peruvian Amazon supported by 
Conservation International and EcoLogic (Bishop et al, 2006). But these 
experiences tend to require high and niche market values, like those 
associated with big game sport or 'trophy' hunting, and/or long-term donor or 
international NGO support.
As discussed in Section 2.13, there is growing demand for certified forest 
products, but as yet this has not resulted in significant premiums and thus 
incentives for SFM - the spread of certification in developing countries has 
therefore been slow, and donor rather than demand-led. A problem for 
certification is that it raises the compliance costs for forest managers, so that it 
is unlikely to 'lift off' as a demand-side incentive until there are strong 
regulatory incentives for it as, for example, in Bolivia (Box 1). On the other 
hand, markets for certified agroforestry products like shade-grown or 'bird- 
friendly' coffee and cocoa have resulted in significantly higher returns for 
farmers, and therefore hold great promise for degraded forest areas or farm- 
forest 'mosaiclands' (Chomitz et al, 2006).
Non-timber forest product markets have clearly stimulated SFM in some areas 
(e.g., rattan in Southeast Asia), but international markets can be volatile as 
discussed in Section 2.2. Vertical intregration and innovative supply-side 
institutional arrangements, like extractive reserves, are essential for 
increasing value-added to managers; otherwise returns to labour tend to be
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very low and may lock forest peoples into poverty. Arguably the most urgent 
policy measure associated with forest product markets is removal of state- 
imposed market restrictions and correction of other marketing policy failures 
(Arnold, 2001). In general 'commodity' markets for timber and NTFPs have not 
perse resulted in SFM, and more diversified multiple-objective forest 
management strategies are more likely to achieve SFM objectives. There is 
also a high potential to combine PES with the sustainable management of 
NTFPs or timber, as is being explored in a few locations, for example in Acre 
State, Brazil (Section 2.7.5).
3.4 Participatory forest management - win-win outcomes?
An important aspect of my research journey has been to consider the 'win-win' 
(environmental and equity) potential of tropical forests. Various donors and 
international NGOs have keenly promoted market-based PFM as a win-win 
strategy. Also governments increasingly see devolution of state forests to 
communities as a low cost strategy for SFM - about 25 per cent of the forest 
area of developing countries is now under community ownership or 
management, and this could double by 2050 (Molnar et al., 2004). There is 
however an asymmetry in the distribution of costs and benefits of PFM which 
may explain why win-win outcomes are rare, and that where they have 
occurred they have needed prolonged donor support (1, 6, 8, 9). Most public 
good benefits of PFM accrue to national and international beneficiaries; and 
with marketed forest products, most of the market value is captured by 
downstream processors and traders. For local forest users, opportunity costs 
are often high, including from limitations on their farming practices and forest 
product extraction. A cynical view might be that getting communities to look 
after forests is a cheap way of obtaining global public goods.
Recent literature (see 2.6.5) backs up my finding that communities, and 
especially indigenous communities, are normally more effective resource 
managers than the state or private sector, largely due to differences in 
underlying incentives. It is observed that PFM with appropriate legal and 
governance support tends to be self-regulating. It is therefore questionable 
whether CFEs should be subject to the same rigour as regards legal
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compliance as industrial forestry, as is the case in forest management 
certification (13).
Several of my papers reveal trade-offs between environmental and social 
outcomes; this reflects the multiple benefits and stakeholders in tropical 
forests and the problems of intra-community equity in PFM. My studies of 
community forestry in South Asia reveal that the benefits are skewed towards 
households with more cattle and agricultural land, and the poorest households 
have become worse off than under open-access commons situations in which 
they had free access to NTFPs, including firewood and grazing (9, 10). 
Environment-equity trade-offs are also discussed at length by Chomitz et al. 
(2006: 60-70), implying they are more the rule than the exception.
The limited success of Integrated Conservation and Development Projects 
(ICDPs) is also instructive. ICDPs have been generally unable to reconcile 
conservation and development objectives, falling short particularly in their 
environmental objectives (Chomitz et al., 2006), as with Honduras' experience 
(4). According to Chomitz et al. (2006), ICDPs are only likely to succeed if 
quid pro quo payments are made to communities based on measured 
conservation outcomes.
The latter observation coincides with my findings (6, 13). Until effective pro- 
poor PES mechanisms are in place, there are equity and even ethical 
concerns about donor encouragement of communities down the high risk 
route of market-based SFM, especially for timber. This is particularly risky for 
Amerindian communities with limited market exposure. Increased risk and 
therefore higher discount rates reduces the viability of SFM. For indigenous 
conservation efforts, a PES or 'contract exchange 1 approach is more likely to 
secure win-win outcomes, and interferes less with traditional CPR 
management systems. Appropriate compensation for indigenous communities 
is a major concern since tropical forests are particularly concentrated in areas 
occupied by indigenous peoples according to Molnar et al. (2004), who also 
suggest that secure property rights or contracts offering social services rather 
than payments may be more effective.
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A problem with PES markets is that they do not inherently favour the poor 
since the primary concern of buyers is environmental cost-effectiveness, as 
well as due to biases in legislation and governance. As pointed out by Molnar 
et al. (2004), additional legislation is usually needed to ensure their property 
rights over ecological services, and institutional support is required to channel 
PES to communities. Another review (Scherr et al., 2004b) concludes that 
PES markets are unlikely to contribute substantially to poverty alleviation 
without subsidies. For example, pro-poor carbon forestry depends on donors 
or governments subsidising the very high transaction costs and diseconomies 
of scale associated with community based carbon trading.
But in the current environment, and with limited alternative livelihood options, 
forest dependent communities have no alternative to pursuing whatever 
market opportunities come their way. When it comes to engagement with 
markets, the first priority is full and effective property rights since "where 
resource rights are informal, contested or weakly enforced, potential benefits 
can be more than offset by the risks of loss of rights to land, to harvest 
products, to environmental services, to access to resources and the 
employment associated with this access, and loss of control and flexibility 
over local development options" (Scherr et al., 2006:37). These include the 
rights to process and market products without undue regulations and charges, 
which have severely limited market access for small-scale producers. In some 
PFM models, as in JFM in India, local users have few or no property rights, 
and, as observed in Himachal Pradesh, can end up as little more than paid 
labourers on Forest Department plantation projects. Where there is greater 
participation in JFM, marketing rights tend to be severely constrained.
At the same time it is important to note that secure tenure and access to forest 
markets do not guarantee SFM; for example, secure tenure can also 
encourage conversion for perennial crops (Chomitz et al., 2006). Market- 
based PFM also needs equitable legislation, administrative and judiciary 
mechanisms that prevent encroachment by outsiders, political support so that 
communities can negotiate on an equal footing with other stakeholders, and
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capacity building to help them develop efficient businesses (Donovan et al, 
2006). There is also a need for partnerships or alliances through the market 
supply chain; international NGOs have brokered several successful 
partnerships between CFEs and downstream processors or importers, 
sometimes involving 'fair trade1 deals (Scherr et al., 2004a).
Several of my papers indicate that win-win outcomes are more likely to 
emerge from a holistic or livelihoods-based approach, rather than a 
commodity focus. For example, the livelihood mosaic of the Mexican 'forest 
ejidos' (1) has proved enduring in spite of weak forest product markets; Bray 
et al. (2004) report the development of 'sustainable landscapes' partly based 
on institutional innovation and an emerging forest transition process. 
Embracing complex livelihood issues is also integral for 'integrated natural 
resource management in tropical forest landscapes' (Frost et al., 2006). In the 
PFM systems of South Asia, an important 'win-win' option is to foster 
agricultural-forestry linkages, for example, upgrading dairy breeds and giving 
the poor access to cattle (10). Arnold (2001) also observes the scope for PFM 
to move from a forest protection orientation to the promotion of sustainable 
livelihoods in agroforestry-based systems. These can take advantage of niche 
but expanding PES markets, e.g., for shade-based 'bird friendly1 or organic 
cocoa and coffee.
Finally, an inherent weakness of the 'win-win' case is that forestry has 
relatively modest poverty reduction impacts and may lock people into poverty 
(Wunder, 2001). While forest product activities can help the poor survive, they 
have less potential than other sectors like agriculture and education to 
contribute to 'livelihood enhancement1 (Arnold, 2001).
3.5 Research recommendations
It would be a major task to identify the research gaps for SFM and 
conservation given the enormous range of research undertaken by institutions 
like the World Bank, CIFOR, Forest Trends, ITTO, FAO, IIED, ODI, World 
Resources Institute and several international NGOs, and in the case of carbon 
forestry by the technical bodies of the UN Climate Change Convention. Rather
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than attempt to identify under-researched areas, I present some 
recommendations which I think have particular 'win-win 1 potential. I have 
classified these into five main areas, accepting that there are obvious overlaps 
between them: avoided deforestation (AD) carbon forestry; forest governance; 
community conservation; SFM and other 'sustainable landscape' livelihood 
options; and extra-sectoral policies.
I have placed considerable emphasis in this narrative on the potential for AD. 
For this to be operationalised, key research priorities include:
  Further analysis of strategies to overcome the obstacles and challenges to 
inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol;
  Investigation of advance funding options, e.g., ex-ante carbon payments 
underwritten by donors and governments, low interest loans, etc.
  Investigation of the country level costs of implementing AD leading to 
identification of cost-effective countries for AD (i.e., those combining high 
rates of deforestation with high potential for improved governance) and 
appropriate support for the development of country programmes;
  Action research to identify appropriate micro-level incentive mechanisms 
to complement national level actions;
  Research into new/appropriate PES institutions to support indigenous and 
other local communities in their response to AD and other PES 
opportunities, e.g., collective action and second tier enterprises that are 
supportive of local institutions and reduce transaction costs.
For forest governance, research priorities include:
> Revision of national forestry and other sector legislation for the design of
simplified and equitable laws and regulations; 
> Illegal logging studies similar to the Central America study (11) that
document the full range of costs to society, and prepare the ground for
follow-up initiatives with constituencies for change; 
> Innovative approaches to equitable law enforcement, judicial
accountability, and legal compliance, including market-based approaches.
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For community-based conservation, priorities include:
> Action research on community concessions, conservation easements or 
other 'contract exchange1 type agreements with indigenous communities;
> Development of certification of bundled ecological services based on 
indigenous or local management practices and standards;
> In upper watershed areas, win-win PES can be encouraged by research to 
establish willingness to pay by downstream beneficiaries for clean water 
from sustainable farming practices, and institutional capacity building for 
effective negotiation and development outcomes (e.g., there are some 
reported cases of strengthened tenure from such initiatives).
As regards SFM and other 'sustainable landscape' livelihood options,
important research and development areas include:
> Research on appropriate capacity building of CFEs, e.g., business
development services, the development of supply chain partnerships,
second tier cooperatives, etc. 
> Promotion of niche market opportunities for agroforestry systems, and
sustainable livelihood options in forest transition zones; 
> Research on the SFM impacts of higher European import standards, and
further analysis of how to influence China's import standards.
Extra-sectoral research priorities include:
> Strategies and technologies to accelerate the demarcation and 
formalisation of the full property rights of resident stakeholders;
> More economic policy research on the environmental impacts of extra- 
sectoral policies, and increased support for inter-sectoral planning 
processes;
> Research on the win-win impacts of human and social capital development 
in forest dependent communities, especially appropriate rural education 
oriented towards sustainable livelihoods.




"The more effective instruments tend to be controversial, expensive, 
difficult to implement, and/or contrary to the prevailing free market 
ideology ... there are few simple, cheap, first-best, non-market 
distorting solutions out there." (Kaimowitz, 2000:230)
My research journey of the 'difficult economies' of tropical forestry concludes 
that domestic forest governance, global governance regulations that stimulate 
PES and capture public good values, secure property rights for resident 
stakeholders and appropriate extra-sectoral policies are key missing 
ingredients of SFM. I have found that market incentives for SFM and 
conservation are weak, and will remain so until the market and policy failures 
are effectively tackled, and a multi-sectoral approach is adopted (Kaimowitz, 
2000). But vested interests in the status quo make it very difficult to tackle the 
policy and governance failures. Therefore the viability of timber-based SFM in 
species-diverse tropical forests remains doubtful. I have also found that in a 
weak regulatory framework, the resource and resident stakeholders are 
vulnerable whether forest values are high or low.
A major concern of this narrative has been the potential for 'win-win' 
outcomes. In general trade-offs between social and environmental objectives 
are more common than win-win outcomes. While PES markets remain 
incipient there are equity/ethical questions about the promotion of market- 
based PFM; indigenous management systems are particularly vulnerable due 
to the clash of market incentives with indigenous institutions. PES markets 
could prove more compatible, but carbon forestry is unlikely to be pro-poor 
unless donors and/or governments subsidise the very high transaction costs. 
It is therefore difficult, at least for this observer, to conceive of an equitable 
solution to what is essentially a public goods problem (ecosystem protection) 
without governments and the international community playing a strong 
governance and regulatory role. In the longer term, progress towards SFM
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and conservation will depend on economic and political (democratic) 
development, including increased accountability of policy decision-makers, the 
forest industry, the state forestry authority and the judiciary to civil society.
I regard 'avoided deforestation' as offering most current hope for tropical 
forest conservation since it is linked to the climate change agenda and 
requires national level programmes, and could therefore harness sufficient 
international political will to tackle the underlying causes of deforestation. In 
theory it links the supply and demand side of SFM by acting as a market 
incentive for improved governance. But there are some major challenges to 
overcome, including the politics of inclusion in Kyoto and the need for up-front 
funding, especially for the legal, governance and policy reform process.
As regards my research hypothesis, my papers confirm that a better 
understanding of the micro-economic incentives experienced by forest 
managers, local users and other stakeholders is essential for effective SFM 
and conservation projects and policies. But my research leads me to slightly 
modify my hypothesis that 'undervaluation' is the main problem for tropical 
forests. In practice higher value forests without effective governance are more 
at threat than lower value forests due to their attraction to rent seeking 
stakeholders, while more distant or inaccessible forests with lower market 
values, but important livelihood and cultural values, are more amenable to the 
multiple objectives of community managers. This means that 'green 
capitalism' approaches to 'saving the rainforest' by giving it market value 
(except for their ecological services) should be treated with great caution.
There is therefore no substitute for a governance based and multi-sectoral 
approach to reduce the opportunity costs of SFM and conservation, as would 
need to happen for countries to receive 'avoided deforestation 1 carbon 
payments. In the final outcome, tropical forests will survive either because 
they are too remote or inaccessible to be worth exploiting or clearing, or 
because their ecosystem services are adequately compensated, as is the 
case for the heavily subsidised forests of most industrialised countries.
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non-economistic manner - for example, by exploring their attitudes to risk, change and 
choice of opportunity rather than inferring everything from a body of economic data. 
The study also promises a little more than it ultimately delivers in respect of its 
engagement of the theoretical underpinnings to rural industrialisation in Indonesia. In 
the first chapter we are fed tempting morsels relating to Piore and Sabel's 'second 
industrial divide 1 and the notion of 'flexible specialisation' in the developing world 
context (Piore and Sabel, 1984). In reality, the only wide concept to which the study 
consistently relates is Clifford Geertz's much criticised notions of 'involution' and 
'shared poverty' (Geertz, 1963). Whilst the analysis refutes the notion that the textile 
industry in Kampung Ciluluk may be displaying involutionary characteristics, one is 
left wondering whether the premise of involution was a useful one to be exploring in 
the first place. Nonetheless, whilst the contribution of the study to wider theoretical 
debates and broader Indonesian contexts might be questioned, it does offer some 
excellent empirical detail and also some insight into the inner workings of rural 
production processes in a particularly interesting locational context. As such, Rural 
Industrialization in Indonesia will be of narrow specialist interest to development 
economists, some Indonesianists and, if they are interested in reading detailed case 
study material, rural development practitioners.
MICHAEL J.G. PARNWELL
Centre for South-East Asian Studies,
University of Hull
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Missing a Moving Target? Colonist Technology Development on the Amazon 
Frontier. By Michael Richards. Londi^i^&v^r^sasj.J3,eive20^aKi^t,.Jfi?fiftite, 1997. 
Pp.xvi + 94. £10.95.ISBNO 85003 301 2 ' "*"" - - 
This ODI research study forms part of the output of a research programme examining 
the institutional aspects of natural resource management and concentrates on socio- 
economic aspects of frontier expansion in Amazonia. Much interest has been 
generated in this area because of the loss of Amazon rainforest, but the author, Michael 
Richards, also highlights the conditions of poverty that exist amongst many of the 
colonists in these frontier regions. Stabilisation of the frontier is conventionally seen 
as the key to slowing deforestation by colonist farmers. Although colonist farmers may 
be important as direct agents of deforestation in Amazonia, stabilisation would also 
limit access of other important agents including cattle ranchers and land speculators. 
The stated objectives of this book are to provide a review of the problems faced by 
colonist farmers; to examine the causes of colonist instability; and to review the 
appropriate institutional, technological and policy responses. The book brings together
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literature from a range of sources, including published material and also 'grey' 
literature from various research and development projects and initiatives in Amazonia.
Colonist farmers are often overlooked by development policy, and have been 
portrayed as the perpetrators of environmental degradation and destruction. The reality 
of course is far more complex, as research analysing the direct and underlying causes 
of deforestation has shown. The interlocking factors, endogenous and exogenous, 
economic, social, ecological and political form the framework determining the 
dynamics of the so-called frontier. These are briefly reviewed in the introduction to the 
book thus justifying its focus on colonist farmers.
Michael Richards provides a very useful summary of the socio-economic context 
of colonist technological development, and a history of colonisation of the Brazilian 
Amazon. Three stages of colonisation are identified and described; the early pioneer 
phase, the emerging market economy, and the closing frontier. These are characterised 
according to a number of factors, including the characteristics of the colonists 
themselves, systems of land tenure, land values and land speculation, government and 
other institutions and interventions, access to credit, off-farm income opportunities, 
and farming systems. Whether such an analysis is able to capture the spatial and 
temporal dynamics and diversity of the region is problematic. In such an abbreviated 
form, there is often a tendency to simplify and generalise, rather than to examine the 
factors which might make reality diverge from such models of frontier development. 
These factors may well be the most interesting from the research perspective, and the 
most informative from the policy perspective.
The sustainability of colonist farming systems and alternative land uses are examined 
in Chapter 3. Various programmes and projects are reviewed, for example, the use of 
green manures, cover crops, perennial cropping systems, agroforestry and different sorts 
of forest management strategies, including extractivism. Again these are quite briefly 
explained, though with reference to a number of examples from different parts of 
Amazonia, some of which are provided in text boxes.
Chapter 4 presents a discussion of policies to support stabilisation of the frontier. It 
notes that colonists are now predominantly from within the Amazon region, not from 
outside as in the past, and this might demand quite different approaches to stabilisation. 
One conclusion is that: 'policy and institutionally-based approaches are likely to be more 
cost-effective at influencing land use practices than technologically-based approaches, 
because land use practices are a response to prevailing farm-level incentives, rather than 
the relative availability of different sorts of technology' (p69). Does this constitute a 
radical shift in the emphasis of current development projects in the region I wonder? It 
might also be interpreted as being rather at odds with the focus on technology 
development in earlier sections, and reflects a slight ambiguity in this respect.
The book contains a very useful reference list and appendices, which include a 
review of colonisation case studies, and statistical evidence of deforestation in the 
Amazon region. It is certainly a very good review and summary of some of the major 
studies and initiatives in the region. It would provide a good background and excellent 
introduction to anyone new to the region and would be most useful to practitioners and 
policy-makers. It is well written, concise and readable. I am not sure it provides any 
answers, but perhaps it doesn't set out to do so. I recommend it to a range of readers 
in development and environment matters, both practitioners, students and those with 
more specific policy interests.
KATRINA BROWN
School of Development Studies,
University of East Anglia
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RICHARDS, M., DAVIES, J. and YARON, G. Stakeholder 
incentives in participatory forest management - a manual 
for economic analysis. ITDG Publishing, London. 2003 
Paperback, 238 pp., ISBN 1-8533-9559-5 £19.95.
Over the last decade or so, the word 'stakeholders' has entered 
into everyday from use by project managers and policymakers. 
Forestry has followed this trend, as governments and forest 
managers have realised that they often cannot pursue their 
interests without considering the impacts of their actions on 
many others around them. This book focuses mainly on the 
economic aspects of stakeholders' behaviour, but it also gives 
a broad perspective on the subject of project and policy 
appraisal.
The book is based on the authors' considerable technical 
knowledge of the subject, backed-up by a large amount of 
research carried out in numerous countries over the last few 
years. The book is divided into two main parts: the first 
presents a general introduction to basic economic concepts, 
while the second presents a systematic guide to 'Economic 
Stakeholder Analysis' or ESA. Although forestry is already 
plagued by numerous different approaches to appraisal (PRA, 
RRA, IRA, etc.), ESA is a valuable addition to the 
practitioner's toolbox, as it simply takes existing and well- 
tried economic methodologies and applies them to the problem 
of participatory forest management.
The first part of the manual explains the main economic 
concepts used in appraisal in a simple way that should be 
understood by most people. It includes a discussion on the 
basic unit of analysis (i.e. the 'household') and economic 
concepts such as: costs, prices and values; marginal analysis; 
and accounting for time (discounting) and inflation. It also 
provides very useful explanations of some of the crucial 
assumptions that economists tend to take for granted.
The second part comprises six chapters that each correspond 
to one of the stages of ESA, plus a summary chapter at the end 
that provides some final guidance about how to perform an ESA. 
All of the chapters are very well organised, starting from simple 
approaches to defining and analysing issues, before gradually 
introducing more complicated techniques and methodologies. For 
those that are interested, it also provides a list of further reading 
at the end of each major topic discussed in the text.
It is particularly pleasing that there is a lot of space in the 
book devoted to the subject of data collection. All too often, 
analysts concentrate on models and calculations but pay far too 
little attention to the integrity and quality of the data that they 
are using. Almost half of the book is devoted to this. It is also 
good to see that the subject of monitoring and evaluation has 
not been overlooked.
The book doesn't use too much jargon or try to 
overcomplicate the subject. This makes it much more accessible 
to the non-expert than many of the other books that are currently 
available on the topic of forestry project and policy appraisal. It 
is also very up-to-date and makes good use of the research results 
obtained in recent studies. Although it is focused on participatory 
forest management, the book will be useful for anyone involved 
in forestry project and policy appraisal. The style and content of 
the book is clearly designed to appeal to non-economists, but 
even specialists might find that it contains a lot of useful
information (such as the recent research results). It is also very 
reasonably priced, which should hopefully make it more 
accessible to potential readers in developing countries.
To summarise, this really is an excellent book and I commend 
it to anyone interested in this subject.
ADRIAN WHITEMAN
BROWN, A., REED, D. and SCARES, P. (eds.). Modelling 
forest systems. CABI Publishing, Wallingford, Oxfordshire, 
UK. 2003. xii + 401 pp. ISBN 0 85199 693 0. £75, hb.
The title, 'Modelling Forest Systems', suggests that the subject is 
system analysis of forests as complex, non-linear natural 
ecosystem with a complex structure, fuzzy dynamic and 
interacting with a hierarchy of similarly natural and cultural 
ecosystems, especially with forestry and forestry-linked economic 
and social systems. Hence, the reader is led by the title to expect 
modelling in context with comprehensive system analysis and 
simulation for understanding, less for predicting systems 
embedded in a system hierarchy.
However, 'Modelling Forest Systems' is a collection of 33 
papers submitted to a workshop of researchers in forest growth, 
increment and yield modelling, held in Sesimbra, Portugal, 2-5 
June, 2002. The papers are loosely grouped in five parts: Forest 
reality and modelling strategies; Mathematical approaches and 
reasoning; Estimation processes; Models, validation and decision 
under uncertainty; Model archives. A sixth part, -^ a synthesis of 
the workshop results - concludes.
The book and each of the five parts are preceded by an 
introduction that gives a general description of the state of the 
art in the subject area but does not refer directly to the contents 
of the respective part and its individual papers.
Part 1 on 'Forest Reality and Modelling Strategies' 
contains seven papers, most of which describe case studies to 
present tactics and principles on the handling of data 
populations, site mapping, carbon accounting, and choice 
between processing procedures. Wider reaching fundamental 
questions and broader system perspectives are discussed at 
the level of strategy in the paper by Hauhs, Knauft and Lange 
'Algorithmic and Interactive Approaches to Stand Growth 
Modelling'. The wider reaching perspective includes the 
expansion from predictive algorithmic modelling to interactive 
modelling which opens the possibility to analyse systems at a 
broader and larger scale. The authors refer to the important 
work by Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988) and particularly to Bent 
Flyvbjerg's (2002) thought-provoking book 'Making Social 
Science Matter'. Interactive modelling with visualisation 
supports the development of realistic interactive 
communication between modeller, model and reality, which 
creates knowledge, understanding and a rational basis for 
strategic decisions, and monitoring of reality.
Part 2 on 'Mathematical Approaches and Reasoning'consists 
of ten papers on a wide range of subjects. The one-page 
introduction gives a very general overview of principles of foresl 
modelling and puts forward two questions concerning future 
work: 'How good are our models for communication?' and 'Car 
traditional process and statistical models be combined into a mon
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Participatory Forest Management (PFM) has assumed a profound significance in national and 
global environmental debates in recent times. The growing interest in this field is fuelled by 
the realization that stakeholders play a crucial role in development interventions. Lack of 
participation is seen as an acute problem faced by the present day development programmes 
in developing countries. The success and the impact of participatory development 
interventions have been questioned by many researchers. In the meantime, it appears that the 
analytical frameworks that integrate the economic analysis into PFM are scarce in the 
literature. Against this background, a manual detailing of the economic principles and 
techniques offers readers a useful analytical guide that explores the economic incentives of 
PFM.
The manual is comprised of nine chapters and divided into two parts: the first part (Chapters 
1 and 2) deals with economic concepts for participatory forest management. The second part 
is comprised of seven chapters. Chapters 3-8 detail 'Economic Stakeholder 
Analysis' (ESA) the analytical framework and its six stages. These chapters present the 
essence of the manual. The final chapter provides a summary of the approach. The title of the 
manual is somewhat misleading as the text is mainly concerned with applying a range of 
economic and Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques in order to make better forest 
land-use decisions. Yet, overall the manual presents a wealth of information, covering a 
range of techniques, which belong to several different paradigms. The contents of the manual
are presented in a readable manner making it useful for a wide range of readers.
Chapter 1 sets out the background and the purpose of the manual. Despite the lack of 
emphasis on definitions of PFM, the ESA is introduced in chapter 1. ESA is presented as an 
extension of standard stakeholder analysis with a focus on the quantification and valuation of 
costs and benefits that affect the decisions of forest users. Examples based on five ESA case 
studies conducted by the authors in a variety of PFM situations, are given throughout the 
manual. Chapter 2 focuses on economic concepts for PFM. This chapter provides a 
theoretical basis for understanding the economic tools used in the ESA. The reader is 
provided with a simple but essential introduction to the concepts such as the unit of economic 
analysis, Total Economic Value (TEV), basis of economic value and opportunity cost. Fairly 
detailed descriptions of price determination, consumer surplus, elasticity and analysis at the 
margin are also presented. The latter part of chapter 2 covers Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
and its components, market failure and policy failure and their relevance to the PFM.
Part 2 of the manual is devoted to present the ESA toolbox. Chapter 3 presents the ESA stage 
1 comprising participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods to identify, prioritize and classify 
forest stakeholders. Chapter 4 focuses on understanding the decision context (ESA stage 2) 
using a variety of PRA methods. Chapter 5 deals with the identification, prioritization and 
quantification of costs and benefits from alternative forest land use (ESA stage 3). A range of 
field research methods are suggested and several examples are provided from the case studies 
mentioned earlier. Valuation of costs and benefits of PFM intervention (ESA stage 4) is 
presented in chapter 6. The toolbox for this stage contains methods such as contingent 
ranking, market price analysis, opportunity cost, replacement cost, barter game and a range 
of non-market valuation methods. The authors draw attention to the fact that different 
methods may lead to different values in addition to address limitations as well as potential of 
each method. Chapter 7 presents a variety of economic tools such as budgeting methods, 
CBA, risk analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis and multiple-criteria analysis to compare 
various forest land-use options (ESA stage 5). The manual depicts its versatility by going 
beyond the conventional neo-classical economic tools and from emphasizing to the 
Practitioner that livelihood decisions are made on much wider criteria than profit 
maximization. In chapter 8, the authors endeavour to provide an overview of the 
participatory analysis and monitoring (ESA stage 6), an area overlooked by many 
participatory interventions. The final chapter (Chapter 9) provides summary guidance points 
of ESA. The main content of the manual is supplemented by six appendices and a glossary. 
Ample references are provided for further guidance at the end of each section. Moreover, 
annotated sources for each ESA stage and further details on economic tools are presented in 
the appendices.
In sum, the authors have succeeded the challenge of integrating economic analysis into 
participatory forest management interventions so that a more rigorous and holistic analytical 
framework is achieved. The text is a rich source of information for those who involved in 
PFM, particularly forest managers, policy advisors, economists as well as non-economists.
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manual under review makes 
a valuable contribution in the 
area of forest economics and 
participatory forest management 
(PFM). To forest economics, it brings 
a fresh Economic Stakeholder Analysis 
(ESA) methodology; and to PFM an 
approach that stakeholders can see 
economic sense in adopting PFM.
The manual aims to demonstrate 
that economic tools can usefully 
complement other methodological 
approaches in the analysis of decision 
making in PFM situations and provides 
a tool box of economic methods 
which, if used appropriately, can lead 
to more informed decision making by 
PFM stakeholders. The manual 
provides practical and accessible 
guidance for using some of the less 
sophisticated economic tools. The 
main users of the manual will be those 
who have a formal training in 
agricultural or national resource 
economics at an undergraduate or 
masters level, but may have limited 
practical experience with PFM 
situation. For such practitioners, the 
manual elegantly bridges the gap 
between knowledge of economic 
principles and the practice of applying 
economic concepts and tools in 
conjunction with other disciplines to 
PFM situations. The main objective cf 
the manual is to explain and critically 
examine existing and emerging 
economic methodologies in terms of 
their potential and limitations to assess 
stakeholder incentives in PFM.
The manual is an output from a 
research project undertaken by the 
authors and funded by the IK
\ Department for International 
: Development (DFID) for its use by 
; developing countries. 
! The manual is organized in two 
I sections. The first section includes 
introduction and concepts comprising 
1 two chapters on economic 
\ stakeholder analysis, economic 
! concepts for PFM; the second section 
: provides an economic stakeholder 
i analysis tool box through seven 
! different chapters. 
! The first chapter begins with a 
; justification as to why such a manual 
i is needed. A distinction is made 
I between "primary" and ."secondary" 
j stakeholders depending on the level 
\ of their engagement with the issue or 
i system. ESA is not only concerned 
I with financial or tangible costs and 
I benefits but also with intangible and 
i non-marketed benefits and costs. 
I Similarly, it is not just about how to 
| derive estimates of non-market values 
i in terms of a common numeric but 
I also about resource use allocation and 
i decision making at the farm, forest or 
i household level. An important aspect 
i of ESA is that it assesses costs and 
[ benefits from the perception of the 
| decision maker or stakeholder. The 
\ chapter also provides summaries of 
i ESA case studies from Nepal, Ghana, 
i Bolivia, Mexico and Zimbabwe 
undertaken by the authors.
Chapter Two of the manual 
discusses the problems of dealing 
with time, risk and uncertainty, and 
multiple objectives in ESA. Beginning 
with a brief overview of some of the 
distinguished economic characte­ 
ristics of forestry, the chapter argues
whether there are any real differences 
between forestry economics and the 
economics of other sector? like 
agriculture and education. The 
authors opine that any policy 
intervention or project has to be 
understood firstly in terms of its 
potential impact and relevance at the 
household or farm level and then to a 
larger level like a forest user group, 
community or eco-region. The 
chapter further discusses a range of 
values or benefits that are likely to 
arise from forestry activities and how 
these values are distributed among 
different stakeholders.
The section concludes that much 
of the mismanagement and inefficient 
use of natural resources are when 
markets are imperfect, thin, or absent, 
and also due to policies which are 
inappropriate for the forest sector.
Section Two of the manual 
provides the toolbox for conducting 
ESA. Chapter Three deals with ESA 
stage 1, that is identification and 
characterization of stakeholders. The 
authors feel that at the end of ESA 
stage 1, the study team should be in a 
position to understand the needs, 
objectives and livelihood alternatives
Information Bulletin on Participatory Forest Management
Resource Unit for Participatory Forestry
of stakeholder group and conflicts 
between them.
Chapter Four introduces ESA stage 
2 where the objective is to understand 
|f the decision-making context and 
*' criteria in PFM and to decide whether 
an economic study is necessary. Thus, 
at the end of this stage the team would 
have a much better understanding of 
the decision making context and the 
problem they are dealing with. They 
would also have a better 
understanding of the role of 
economics, if any, in making the 
decision, and what economic data is 
needed by evaluating alternative land 
use options and economic resource 
allocation criteria.
ESA stage 3 comprises many 
shortcut data collection methods so 
as to exercise economy of data 
collection. It proposes that multi- 
disciplinary teams comprising 
economists, foresters, and PRA 
experts should work together to get 
accurate data. The authors conclude 
that shortcut methods such as single 
jr. memory recall visit are cheap and 
' quick but are no substitute for 
longitudinal research methods such as 
multiple visit survey, participatory 
monitoring, researcher participation 
and observation, household re­ 
cording, physical measurement, inven­ 
tories, and permanent sample plots.
The sixth chapter is the most
important component of the manual
> and is devoted to valuation of costs
j and benefits. This also makes ESA
''I"stage 4 where the objective is to
estimate unit values or pricing using.
appropriate valuation methods. It
compares financial analyses taking
.the viewpoint of local forest users
and economic efficiency analysis
which provides a wider national/
society viewpoint. Seven steps that
constitute the ESA stage 4 tool box
. are discussed in detail. The authors in
a very lucid manner provide case
, studies within the chapter as well as in
the appendix for each valuation
technique, which makes the under-
; standing and use of techniques very easy.
; ESA stage 5 is presented in Chapter
; Seven where the objective is to carry
; out a comparative economic analysis
i of forest-based land use or
; livelihood options to help PFM
stakeholders make better informed
i decisions: here the cost and
i benefits of alternative decision
: making options are identified,
I quantified and valued. This stage
: tool box comprises tools such as
partial budgeting, gross margin, net
; margin and farm income analysis,
: discounting, Net Present Value,
\ Internal Rate of Return, Benefit Cost
; Ratio, sensitivity analysis, risk
; assessment, decision analysis and
.; other economic decision making
• criteria like cost-effective and multi-
; criteria analysis. •
: Throughout, the manual
: emphasizes that livelihood decisions
i are made on a much wider range of
i criteria and judgments rather than
; profit maximization. It is, therefore
i essential for the economist to gain a
: good prior understanding of the wider
: stakeholder decision-making criteria in
: ESA stage 2 and apply this knowledge
i when interpreting the results of
i comparative economic analysis.
I One way that economic and
; scientific studies the world over have
i failed is that they do not discuss
; calculation and findings with primary
I beneficiaries of stakeholders. The
; reason may be lack of time, poor
; planning, lack of communication
| skills, or merely a top-down bias. An
; essential part of ESA process is that
I the stakeholders themselves are able
i to make use of the economic
! information which has been
generated. Thus ESA stage 6 attempts
to return the economic data to the
primary stakeholders and discusses
with them how the ESA analysis can
contribute to decision making. It
then verifies and triangulates the
results with the stakeholders. The
authors substantiate these two steps
of ESA stage 6 with three very
informative case studies exploring 
equity in community forestry in Nepal, 
incentives for cocoa farmers to keep 
timber trees in Ghana, and innovative 
approaches to returning economic 
data in the Brazilian Amazon. At the 
end ESA stage 6 suggests to develop 
a participatory monitoring system for 
the primary stakeholders to measure 
the progress of their livelihood choices.
The authors provide a continuum 
of such M&E systems at the level of 
communities, local government/ 
NGOs, national government and 
donors. A very interesting case study 
from Prunus Africana in the upper 
montane forests of Mount Camaroon 
in the form of a reporting chart for 
monitoring of benefits has been 
presented at the end of the eighth 
chapter. The authors argue that an 
additional ESA stage is needed for 
secondary stakeholders in PFM. 
Donors and policymakers will need 
summary reports of the study. To do 
this effectively, the research team 
should be thinking about ways of 
disseminating research results from 
the start of the project.
The concluding chapter provides 
summary guidance points for 
performing ESA, and it is hoped that 
the manual will give economists the 
confidence to use their practical skills 
and experience to apply a range of 
economic tools in PFM. Detailed 
appendices at the end provide a wide 
range of case studies following various 
valuation techniques.
The authors deserve credit for 
: providing a handy toolkit which would 
be relevant in the Indian scenario 
where large communities depend on 
forests but are still not convinced to 
join PFM projects/programs. The 
manual is timely and comes as an 
invaluable source to generate 
information for researchers, policy- 
makers, departments, NGOs and 
donor agencies and, above all, the 
communities/primary stakeholders to 
know if it makes economic sense to 
adopt PFM projects.
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Bulletin on Participatory Forest Management
Stakeholder Incentives in Participatory Forest Management: a Manual 
for Economic Analysis. Michael Richards, Jonathan Davies and Gil 
Yaron, ITDG Publishing, London, ISBN 1 85339 559 5 £19.95
This is a valuable book in that it contributes to bridging the gulf between the 'soft' 
participatory approaches to forest management that have become so fashionable 
and productive in less developed countries and the application of 'hard' economic 
principles to forest management. On the first page the authors argue that 'this 
manual aims to demonstrate that economic tools can usefully complement other 
methodological approaches in the analysis of decision-making in Participatory Forest 
Management (PFM) situations and provides a toolbox of economic methods, which, if 
used appropriately, can lead to more informed decision making'. However, 
retrospectively the authors almost reverse the claim, arguing it is hoped that this 
manual will give economists the confidence to go out and use their practical skills 
and experience in PFM.'(p180) So we remain slightly uncertain as to whether the 
authors are trying to teach economists PFM or PFM practitioners economics. Such 
considerations might shape the ideal structure of the book. This reviewer believes 
that the more appropriate target is PFM practitioners, but that, inevitably, one book 
alone is insufficient to skill PFM practitioners in the sometimes arcane ways of 
economics.
The book is laid out as a manual. After a couple of introductory chapters which make 
up part I, the six key stages of what is termed 'Economic Stakeholder Analysis' 
constitute the chapters of part II of the book. These comprise: the identification and 
characterisation of stakeholders; understanding the decision-making context and role 
of economics; identification and physical quantification of costs and benefits; 
valuation of costs and benefits; economic comparison of decision-making 
alternatives; and participatory analysis and monitoring. A summary chapter 
reiterates the main points and a series of Appendices expand on a the key points 
made in that chapter's text.
The standard layout of a chapter includes an overview, a tabular indication of the 
contents of the toolkit in that chapter, boxed 'issues', case study examples and 
indications as to where further guidance may be found, with and a concluding section 
summing up the key points of that stage. Such a format gives the reader a chance to 
assess, assimilate and reinforce the key messages.
Throughout the text, extensive use is made of examples, which undoubtedly enrich 
the text. These examples often come from projects with which the authors have had 
involvement. In addition, a number of key points are expanded upon in boxes. 
These boxes are most widely used in Chapter 5 and some of the points might have 
been made as effectively embedded in the text, rather than as boxed components. 
There is even some confusion between boxes and examples (unboxed) with at least 
one example being mistakenly(?) embedded in a box.
On p 43 the authors state that 'the main problem for SFM is that, due largely to 
market and policy failures it is more profitable to cut down trees than to retain or 
manage them.' The clear implication is that prevailing market prices and abundant 
external effects and market failures in less developed countries discriminate both 
against PFM and the poor. SFM seeks to redress these factors, but this judgement 
presumes that ESA will always confirm the PFM solution. Although the examples 
used, especially in relation to the value of NTFPs in the Amazon, support this view, 
there is a danger of the authors prejudging the result, rather than using the 
techniques to ascertain a result. All the examples relate to developing countries,
which is a pity, for there may be situations in transition economies where the some 
elements from the toolkit could usefully be deployed.
Elswewhere, it is argued that economic analysis is 'extractive' and that this is 
somehow a problem. Quite what this means is unclear. Do the authors mean that 
'extractive' economic measurements are somehow inaccurate, or do they mean that 
accurately estimated economic values are somehow invalid because the 
stakeholders to whom these values relate cannot understand them? The extent to 
which a comprehensive and comparable set of economic values can satisfy both 
stakeholders and economists is not clear.
The authors recognise a need to defer to an expert at certain times. If this is a 
textbook for economists, as indicated at one point, one assumes that they might hold 
this expertise, or at least be capable of learning it. If it is a textbook for practitioners 
of PFM, it should undoubtedly advance their understanding of economics, but leaves 
this reviewer with an uneasy feeling that the PFM practitioner may not be drinking 
deeply enough at the Pierian spring.
There is a minor inaccuracy in the discounting table. The example in Table 2.5 is 
wrong. According to Appendix 3 the present value of Rs1 after one year at a 5% rate 
of discount should be .95 not 1.0. A further problem is that depreciation is mentioned 
as part of the key point summaries in a chapter on page 96 but is not explained until 
some thirty or so pages later on p129.
The layout can at times be unnecessarily peppered with bullet points, as between 
pages 82 and 88. Such excessive use of bullet points means that the key points 
cannot be picked out at all clearly.
All in all, this is a useful book based on a sound underlying aspiration, with many 
good examples to learn from, which can provide, in association with identified web- 
based materials, a sound grounding in basic economics applied to PFM. However, in 
relation to its objectives, it is not totally clear whom the target audience is, and amidst 
all the concern about extractive research, the real challenge is surely to ensure that 
decisions about forestry, as well as being better understood at local level by a range 
of stakeholders, are simply based on more accurate economic information. This will 
then help external agents and local practitioners make better-informed decisions 
about the management and uses of trees and forests.
If the book does not quite live up to its aspirations, it remains a valuable contribution 
to enhancing the economic literacy of those involved in PFM, as a result of which it 
might be hoped that better decision making might ensue.
Bill Slee
Professor of Rural Economy,
University of Gloucestershire
OTHER REFERENCES AND EXTRACTS FROM EMAILS
Publication 6: Development and Change, 1997
Mentioned in Keynote Address by Dr David Kaimowitz, Director General of 
CGIAR Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Indonesia, at The 
Tenth Biennial Conference of International Association for the Study of 
Common Property (IASCP) 10 August 2004, Oaxaca, Mexico.
'A number of years ago, I was struck by a piece by Michael Richards 
that showed how market forces, migration and national forces were 
gradually eroding the social capital in Latin America's indigenous 
communities and breaking down many of their institutions for managing 
common property.'
www.indiana.edu/~iascp/kaimowitzkevnote.pdf
p.6, slide #12: 'Supporting old traditions, creating new ones':
Publication 9: ITDG Publishing, 2003
Email from Dr Madhu Verma, Associate Professor, Forest Resource 
Economics and Management, Indian Institute of Forest Management, Bhopal
29 October 2005 15:14
'We have couple of copies of your book in our library and have 
received excellent feedback by our faculty and students. I am also 
using it frequently both for teaching and fieldwork.'
Email from Phil Franks, Poverty-Environment Network Coordinator, CARE 
International
29 September 2006 12:53
'I have your book and in fact we are currently engaged in an action 
research project with ODI on the costs and beenfits (sic) of PFM in 4 
countries (partly funded by this EMPAFORM project) using at least one 
of the tools from your book.'
Publication 10: Journal of Forest and Livelihood, 2003
Emails from Dr Maksha Maharjan, Program Coordinator, CARE Nepal, 
Katmandu
19 April 2003 13:07
'Currently equity and transparency as essential elements of 
governance are frequently raised in participatory natural resource 
management in Nepal. In this context, the CARE-Nepal is operating a 
program named 'Strengthened Actions for Governance in Utilization of 
Natural Resource1 (SAGUN) with the financial support of USAID. The 
program includes three big components: Forestry and Buffer Zone, 
Irrigation and Partnership for Hydropower. As the Chief of Party of the 
program, I am planning to use our learning from our case studies to 
monitor governance in the program.'
30 October 2003 10:35
'Currently, we are planning to conduct a similar type of case study in 
the Bardia Buffer Zone Development Project as we did in the Koshi 
Hills. In fact, Participatory Economic Analysis is a very powerful tool to 
raise awareness about equitable distribution of benefits and services 
among the User Groups and the Policy makers. You would not believe 
now participatory well-being ranking for equitable distribution of 
benefits is mandatory in CF in Nepal. The recent CF Operational 
Guidelines have incorporated all these issues for sustainable and 
equitable CF. Who knows one day the Participatory Economic Analysis 
would be another integral part of CF process.'
(CF = Community Forestry) 
19 April 2005 16:39
'You will surprise to know that many students and scholars are referring 
our articles for their dissertation. I must say this is not our small 
achievement. In Nepal, the policy makers are now seriously thinking 
how Community Forestry be managed to make it more pro-poor and 
provide economic justice to the poorer households. Certainly, your 
research work will add more values on this part.'
LETTER FROM EDITOR OF INTERNATIONAL FORESTRY REVIEW
^COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY ASSOCIATION
Linking foresters throughout the world
9: lb Tel: +44(0)1588672868 
Umcnope Fax. +44(0)8700116645 
Craven Arms Email: cfa@cfa-mternational.org 









Further to our discussion I would be pleased if you would consider submitting a 
manuscript for possible publication in the International Forestry Review based on 
your extensive experience surrounding incentives for Sustainable Forest 
Management. While there are many papers that deal with particular aspects of both 
market-based and non-market incentives I feel that there is a lack of published 
analysis linking the development of thought overtime through to the role of regulatory 
incentives and forest governance issues.
I look forward to developing the paper with you. 
With best wishes 
Yours sincerely
Alan Pottinger
Editor, International Forestry Review
APPENDIX 4
STATEMENTS OF CO-AUTHORS 
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Friday, April 22, 2005 
Dear Dr. Morgan
Re: Michael Richards: Application to register for the award of 
Doctor of Philosophy by Publication
I worked closely with Michael Richards at the Overseas Development Institute on the DFID- 
financed Forestry Research Programme (R6914). The principal output of this programme was the 
publication of the manual "Stakeholder Incentives in Participatory Forest Management. A Manual 
for Economic Analysis" (ITDG, 2003). The manual was co-authored by Michael Richards, Gil 
Yaron, and myself.
Michael was the instigator of the research concept, and responsible for the programme, as well as 
undertaking much of fieldwork.
In my opinion the breakdown for the co-authors' contribution to the cited publication is as follows:
Michael Richards: 60% 










Web site: www.gya.co.uk 
01 February 2006
To Whom It May Concern:
Re: Stakeholder incentives in participatory forest management by Michael 
Richards, Jonathan Davies and Gil Yaron
Critical appraisal of previous work
Although not included in the book, the DFID research project included a literature 
review of the application of natural resource economics to the analysis of participatory 
forestry. While the book does not have a specific section which summarises this, I think 
it is strongly informed by a critical appraisal of previous applications of economics to 
participatory forestry situations. Since MR and JD did the earlier literature review, they 
were mainly responsible for this aspect of the work; MR was particularly responsible for 
Part 1 of the Book which grounds the more practical sections (in Part 2) in a discussion 
of natural resources economic theory as applied to participatory forestry type situations. 
I helped him make these discussions accessible to a non-econornist readership.
In Part 2, all the authors contributed examples from the literature which complement 
the case study examples derived from the five field case studies undertaken by MR and 
JD.
Methodology design
My contribution in this area was to help review and refine a first draft of the book that 
had gaps and limitations. My understanding is that MR, as the GDI project leader and 
responsible for reporting to the DFID Forestry Research Programme, was primarily 
responsible for methodology, with support from JD. From what I have seen of the field 
case studies they have a sound methodological design, while recognising that the data 
comes from fairly short-term studies.
GY Associates Limited - Registered in England and Wales No. 04438521
Implementation of research
f?fLn l had n° involvement in the earlier literature review and the five field case studies 
led by MR and JD, but introduced some important examples into the book from my 
previous fleldwork, especially in Africa. Again MR was clearly the research leader. My 
involvement with MR in a training course in Nicaragua using an early draft of the Book 
also allowed me to have an important input into the later version of the book (e.g., help 
with language style, structure, layout, examples, etc.).
Data analysis
I contributed several examples in the book based on my own research while MR and JD 
focussed on the five DFID case studies. Some of these examples I also developed on an 
interactive website (to which MR made a more marginal contribution, and JD a more 
significant one) which accompanies the book.
Theory development
The book may not represent a significant contribution to theory development, but I 
think the development of the 'Economic Stakeholder Analysis' (ESA) framework has an 
importance - in terms of the state of the art - far beyond participatory forestry. Over the 
last decade there has been an enormous increase in interest in sustainable livelihood 
and poverty issues. However these have been analysed either in predominantly 
qualitative frameworks (like DFID's sustainable livelihoods framework) or from more 
quantitative perspectives involving sophisticated and disciplinary grounded methods 
which are not very accessible to most developing country practitioners, and are often 
not useful in terms of practical ways of moving forward - often because they ignore the 
perspectives of the primary beneficiaries. The strength of the ESA framework, which is 
central in this book, is that it attempts, I think successfully, to bring together more 
participatory livelihood based approaches which are grounded in primary stakeholder 
perspectives, and straightforward quantitative and traditional economic tools. This 
results in a reasonably empirical, livelihood and problem-focused approach which can be 
of benefit to the primary stakeholders in terms of helping them make decisions over the 
use of their livelihood resources (while admitting that it is not always possible to directly 
involve primary stakeholders in decisions based on economic data). Mixed qualitative 
and quantitative analysis is a research interest of mine but the application for 
participatory forest management was very much MR's personal vision, and I was happy 
to help him and JD develop a coherent 'field manual 1 type textbook for its realisation.
Gil Yaron
GY Associates Limited - Registered in England and Wales No. 04438521
Associates Ltd





To Whom It May Concern:
Re: M. Richards, J. Davies and G. Yaron (2003), Stakeholder Incentives in 
Participatory Forest Management, ITDG Publications, UK
For the purposes of his PhD assessment, I would like to confirm that Michael's 
contribution to this book was 60% of the total.
(Dr) Gil Yaron 
Director
GY Associates Limited - Registered in England and Wales No. 04438521
CARE Msfsal 
January 6, 2006 
TLM4736 P.O. Box iwi.
Nepal
tet 977-1-5522800 






This letter is to confirm that 1 agree to fee following percentages for authorship responsibility for 
the papa- "Economy Poverty and Transparency. Measuring Equity in Forest User Groups" 
which appeared in the Journal of Forest and Livelihood 3 (I): 94-104
Michael Richards 50% 
Maksha M&hsrjan 25% 
Keshav Kanel 25%
My comments on our contribiitions to the paper, according to the categories mentioned by the 
University of Glamorgan, are as follows:
1 , Critical appraisal of previous work:
All of three critically reviewed our previous research sttKiy methodology from 1999; ail
con&ibuted to this. However your contribution to synJbesiae the appraisal was outstanding.
2. Methodology design:
Methodology of the research work was jointly deslgfied,
We afl eanMbufed to in discussions, while Keshav Kaael and yourself took the lead in developing
the survey and other instruments In the field. To some extent, I managed to contribute some of
my experiential learning gained from t&e previous research works to our study.
3. Implementation, of research:
Soft Keshav Kaoel and yourself contributed while collecting additional data. However, I
managed to assist both of you,
4.
Year leadership and hand work for the date processing on Excel sheets, developing the gross
maf^a analysis, the 'eqaity indicators', graphs, etc was very appreciable.
5. Theory development:
f think this paper did not contribute to theory par sej It did cootribute to methodology 
development, in particular a more 'participatory fiveiUtaod economies' approach to comraamty 
foiesfry issues, and in which we attempted to costume more traditional economic tools 0ite 
household surveys and gross matpB saalysis) with participatory approaches to collecting and 
analyzing date, with the aim of generating useM eqyhy and gender indicators which are 
reveaiins as to the poverty impacts of community forestry. Clearly we al! contributed to these 
dlsoissfoss. However, you were respoaslble for synthesizing them in this paper,
Lastly, I aim very confident to quote that ow paper is contributing to & large extent to conduct 
acdoa research on economic impacts of ComtiHHiity Forestry in "Nepal and many researehets have 
been referring our paper in Urerr studies. In Has regard, I would 3ike to propose to share our 
authorship responsibility in the following percentages:



































Sbcmid you need any clarification on scaring our authorship responsibility! please Set me know.
Wilfe "best regard,
Yows sincerely,.
Maksba R. M^iaffjan. Pb.D. 
Pjogigsj Coordinator, 
CAREMejjal
Kcshav Raj Kanel, Ph.D.
Resource Economist
G.P.Q. 2528; Kalhmandu, Nepal









This letter is to cotifinn that 1 agree to the following percentages for authorship 
responsibility for the paper "Econnmics, Poverty and Transparency. Measuring Hquity 
in Forest User Groups" which appeared in the Journal of Forest and Livelihood 3(1): 
94-104
Michael Richards 50% 
Keshav Kanel 25% 
Makeha Mahan&n 25%
My comments on our contributions to the paper, according to ihe categories 
mentioned by the University of Glamorgan, are as follows;
1 - Critical appraisal of previous work:
We critically reviewed our previous research Study methodology from 1999; all 
contributed to this, and Michael did the synthesis.
2. Methodology design:
This is something we all contributed to in discussions, while
1 and Michael look the lead in developing the survey and other instruments in
the field
3. Implementation of research;
Again mainly Michael and I took the lead in the implementation of the 
research. The questionnaires were translated into Nepal!, and representatives 
of the users of community forests provided the actual data far the study.
4. Data analysis:
Michael was reBponsible for this, doing the data processing on Excel sheets, 
developing the gross margin analysis, the 'equity indicators1, graphs, etc
5. Theory development:
I think we can say (hat while this paper did nol contribute to theory per se, it 
did contribuw to methodology development, in particular a more 'participatory- 
livelihood economies' approach to community forestry issues, and in which we 
attempted to combine more traditional economic tools (Tike household surveys
and gross margin analysis) with participatory approaches to collecting and 
analysing data, with the aim of generating useful equity and gender indicators 
which are revealing as to the poverty impacts of community forestry. Clearly 
we all contributed to these discussions, and Michael was responsible for 
synthesirjg them in this peper But maybe this is not theory development.
If you have any questions regarding this matter, please feel free to contact me in the 
above address.
Sincerely yours,




111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SEi 7JD, UK
Tel: ^44 (.0)20 792: 0300
Fax: -1-44 (0)20 7922 0399
Website: www.odi.org.jk
Email: i;ifo<a!Odi.org.i.ik
"Impacts of megality and barriers to legality: a diagnostic analysis of illegal logging in Honduras and 
Nicaragua" M. RICHARDS, A. WELLS, F. DEL GATTO, A. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA and D. 
POMMIER
Personal reference re contribution of Michael Richards to research design, execution and outcome
Adrian Wells (co-author)
Research Officer




1. Design and research methodology
Michael conceived of and led on designing the project "Governance and poverty impacts of the illegal timber trade in 
Central America", in partnership with research colleagues in Honduras, Nicaragua, as well as in ODI and Global 
Witness. This included the research methodology that formed that basis for this joint paper, spanning case study work 
in six field locations, analysis of the legal and institutional barriers to legality faced by small-scale forest producers 
and, in particular, analysis of the economic impacts in both Honduras and Nicaragua.
2. Execution of the research
While in-country analysis was undertaken by Honduran and Nicaraguan partners, as well as an FAO consultant, 
Michael took responsibility for routinely monitoring the quality of research reports, critical analysis of results, and their 
synthesis into research reports and briefing papers for dissemination.
3. Analysis of data and outcomes
Michael took particular responsibility for the economic analysis of the impacts of the illegal timber trade. See 
RICHARDS, M., DEL GATTO F. and ALCOCER LOPEZ, G. 2003 "The Cost of Hlegal Logging in Central America. 
How Much are the Honduran and Nicaraguan Governments Losing?" Consultant report for the project Illegal Logging 
in Central America - Tackling its impacts on Governance and Poverty, Overseas Development Institute, London. 
www.talailegal-centroamerica.org.
This analysis included order of magnitude assessments of the scale of fiscal losses to the Nicaraguan and Honduran 
government as a result of the illegal logging trade (loss stumpage charges on production from national forest land, 
municipal revenues and income tax). It also included indirect economic losses from wasted expenditure' on 
'sustainable forest management' (SFM) by both national forest sector and foreign aid; as well as losses to 
environmental services and other national and global 'non-market' values from broadleaf forests attributable to illegal 
logging in Honduras and Nicaragua. The figures arising from the economic analysis were essential in securing the 
attention of policy makers during subsequent policy engagement.
The institute is hmiieri by
Re»isti.':tion Mn. bdiSiS Sogisti'ic-t! Offif.e ;:s aboi't- Ch«jniy No. J






Witney OX29 7QZ 
UK
04 November 2005
111 Westminster Bridge Road, London SEi /JD, UK
Tel: + 44 (0)20 7022 0300




This letter is to confirm that I agree to the following percentages for authorship 
responsibility for the paper "Impacts of illegality and barriers to legality; a diagnostic 









Forest: Policy and Environment Programme
The Institute is limited by jgj)ram«B Ragistralion No. 661818 Registered Ofnce ss above Chsriiy No. UJS^R
oar.n 11 a i nr ^^•J- vvj RT:QT Ciiiir TT.'K'l
Filippo Del Gatto











This letter is to confirm that I agree to the following percentages for authorship 
responsibility for the paper "Impacts of illegality and barriers to legality: a diagnostic 




Filippo Del Gatto 25%
Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla 10%
Denis Pommier 5%
Beyond your lead role in writing the paper for the International Forestry Review, I 
believe that you gave fundamental contributions to several other aspects of the work:
1) First, your contributions and comments were a key factor in the initial conception 
of the research idea, without which I cannot see how this study could have been 
developed. Furthermore, your efforts and support were also fundamental for 
REMBLAH 1 and myself in the relationship with the donors (DFID, World Bank, 
CIDA and IDB). Again, without your support I can not see how we could have 
managed to do it.
2) Second, I believe that you had a central role in defining the methodology of the 
research; in particular, in suggesting the division of the research between field case 
studies (focused on the implications of illegal logging and trade for communities and 
local people) and thematic studies at national and regional level (focused on policies 
and institutions as well as the economic impacts of illegal logging and trade).
3) Third, your feedback during the writing of the policy briefs was fundamental to 
bridge the micro-level of communities and people with the macro-level of policies 
and institutions.
1 Red de Manejo del Basque Latifoliado de Honduras (Honduran Broadleaf Forest Management 
Network).
th °?rth'. ^ entire economic analysis relied heavily on you, from the 
methodological setting up and supervision to the data analysis and final elaboration of 
tfte economic impacts paper.
; irth, I believe that the economic analysis that you carried out is the most 
innovative part of the research. There have not been many attempts to the macro- 
economic quantification of illegal logging and trade, especially in Latin America, so 
tnis analysis represents in my opinion a significant contribution to knowledge. This is 
also reflected by the wide impact that this economic calculation has had in Honduras, 
where it has been (and continues to be) widely debated and cited by multiple 
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